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JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. §78A-3-102. The matter has been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant
to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON
HARRISONS APPEAL

The Harrisons have misstated certain of the issues presented for review on their
appeal and the standard of appellate review. A corrected statement of the issues
presented for review and any correction to the standard of appellate review are as
follows:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court erred in holding that NYA did not breach the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it exercised its contractual right to extend
va

the specific settlement date by the monthly payment of additional earnest money.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court erred in holding that the Harrisons breached

the REPC by refusing NYA's valid tender of payment that only contained conditions that
NYA had a right to insist upon under the REPC and therefore was unconditional.
ISSUE NO. 3: No correction.
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the district court erred in holding that NYA did not breach the

REPC as a matter of law because Harrison's breach excused NYA from making
additional earnest money deposits and closing the purchase of the Property. The court

reviews the "interpretation of the contract" and the effect of Harrison's breach for
"correctness." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ,I16, 84 P.3d 1134.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON
CROSS-APPEAL
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court erred in holding that the REPC required NYA

Q

to make a demand for liquidated damages to be entitled to recover liquidated damages
from Harrisons. The court reviews a district court's interpretation of a contract and its
grant of summary judgment for correctness. Green River, 2003 UT 50, ,r16. See also
Selvig v. Blockbuster Enters., LC, 2011 UT 39, 266 P.3d 691. This issue was preserved
in NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-319), and its Motion for

~

Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated damages (R728-762) and reply (R802852).
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the District Court erred in holding that by not making a demand

for liquidated damages NYA had elected to pursue other remedies available at law,
namely actual damages. An appellate court reviews a district court's interpretation of a
contract for correctness and also reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment
for correctness. Green River, 2003 UT 50, ,r16. The Court reviews whether an election
of remedies has been made under a correctness standard. Selvig, 2011 UT 39. This issue
was preserved in NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-319), its Motion
for Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated damages (R728-762) and reply
(R802-852).
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ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the District Court erred in holding that NYA had elected the

remedy of actual damages and was therefore not entitled to pursue nor recover liquidated
damages from Harrisons. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination as to
whether an election of remedies has been made under a correctness standard. Selvig,
2011 UT 39. This issue was preserved in NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(R290-3 l 9), its Motion for Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated damages
(R728-762) and reply (R802-852).
ISSUE NO. 4: If NYA is entitled to recover liquidated damages, whether the district

court erred in failing to award NYA its attorneys fees with respect to the claims for
liquidated damages. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination whether
an election of remedies has been made under a correctness standard. Selvig, 2011 UT 39.
An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of who is the prevailing party
under an abuse of discretion standard. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 1 I, 40 P.3d
1119. This issue was preserved in NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290319), its Motion for Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728762) Affidavits of Attorneys Fees (R402-4 l l, 414-454, 461-462) and reply (R802-852),
its Motion to Amend or Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R900-910) and its Motion to
Amend Order and Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award
(R927-939) and reply (R991-1006).
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the district court erred in failing to award NYA certain of its

attorneys fees including for research. An appellate court reviews the amount of attorneys
fees awarded by the district court under an abuse of discretion standard. Dale K. Barker
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Co., PC v. Bushnell, 2010 UT App 189, 237 P.3d 903. This issue was preserved in
NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-319), its Motion for Summary
Judgment for Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-762) Affidavits of Attorneys
Fees (R402-411, 414-454, 461-462) and reply (R802-852), its Motion to Amend or
Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R900-910) and its Motion to Amend Order and
Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R927-939) and
reply (R991-1006).
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the District Court erred in failing to award NYA interest on the
amount of the Earnest Money Deposits made by NYA from the date of each such
payment. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination as to the entitlement
to pre-judgment interest under a correctness standard. Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App
241, 75 P.3d 925. This issue was preserved in NYA's Motion for Summary Judgment for
Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-762).
ISSUE NO. 7: If NYA is entitled to recover liquidated damages, whether the District
Court erred in failing to award NYA interest on NYA's liquidated damages.

An

appellate court reviews the entitlement to pre-judgment interest under a correctness
standard. Anderson, 2003 UT App 241. This issue was preserved in NYA's Motion for
Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-762).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN. §15-1-1(2) (Interest rate to be 10% per annum where contract does not
specify rate of interest) (Attached as Exhibit I)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NYA and Harrisons entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract with addenda
(collectively "REPC") in November 2006 under the terms of which NYA was purchasing
the real property of Harrisons with a settlement deadline or closing date 1 of October 31,
2007. The REPC had an initial earnest money deposit of $10,000. It also permitted
NYA, at its sole discretion, to make monthly $6,250.00 payments of additional earnest
money in order to extend the settlement date of the REPC on a monthly basis beyond the
October 31, 2007 settlement date to the end of the next month. NYA paid the initial
earnest money deposit of $10,000 and beginning in October, 2007 monthly paid
additional earnest money deposits totalling $137,503.00 in order to extend the settlement
date on a monthly basis.
In March, 2009, contrary to the express terms of the REPC, Harrisons unilaterally
asserted that a reasonable time for NYA to close had already passed, that NYA was in
breach by failing to close and demanded that NYA close by August 5, 2009 or they
would exercise their rights under the REPC.

Following unsuccessful settlement

discussions, the instant litigation was commenced by NYA in June, 2009 with a
counterclaim filed by Harrisons in July, 2009.

Consistent with previous months, on

August 31, 2009, NYA tendered another $6,250 earnest money deposit in order to extend
the closing date for an additional month. Although NYA had the right to extend the
closing in its sole discretion by making such monthly payment, because the payment was

5

being tendered beyond Harrisons' demanded August 5, 2009 closing date and because of
the pending litigation, NYA included a letter of explanation as to its reasons for
extending. The letter requested an acknowledgement from Harrisons that NYA was
entitled to extend the closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC.
Harrisons rejected NYA's valid tender, returned NYA's earnest money deposit,
demanded the withdrawal of what were characterized as "inappropriate conditions" and
asserted that the NYA's actions constituted additional breaches of the REPC.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted NYA's
motion and denied Harrisons' motion, ruling that:
(a)

NYA was not obligated to close within a reasonable time because the

REPC provided for a specific closing date and for unlimited monthly extensions of the
specific closing date;
(b)

NYA had not breached the REPC or the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing;
(c)

NYA's tender of the August 2009 earnest money payment was valid tender

because it only included conditions NYA had a right to insist upon;
(d)

Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing the August 2009 tender of

additional earnest money deposit; and
(e)

NYA was entitled to its contractual remedies under the REPC against

Harri sons.

1

Although October 31, 2007 is referred to in the REPC as the "'Settlement Deadline" and the process as
"Settlement". "Settlement" and "Deadline" may be referred to herein as "Settlement Date" or "Closing Date" and
the process as "Closing".
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NYA filed a subsequent motion for summary judgment for its damages, liquidated
damages and attorney's fees. NYA was granted judgment for damages for the $147,503
earnest money deposits which it had paid to Harrisons, interest thereon but only from
August 31, 2009 and certain of its attorneys fees. The court denied NYA judgment for
liquidated damages equal to the earnest money deposits as provided in the REPC and
interest thereon because it incorrectly ruled that NYA had elected to pursue other
remedies at law namely actual damages.

The court also denied certain of NYA's

attorneys fees including those associated with its liquidated damage claims because it was
not the prevailing party on the liquidated damages issue.
Harrisons have appealed the judgement and NYA has cross appealed with respect
to the denial of its claims for liquidated damages, interest and attorneys fees.
RESPONSE TO HARRISONS' FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Many of Harrisons' Factual Background are not facts, but are argument.

In

addition, portions of Harrisons' Factual Background states or mischaracterizes the facts
before the court.

NYA responds to certain of such facts below with the paragraph

numbering conforming to Harrisons' paragraph numbering. Other responses are included
in NYA's argument.
19.

Two months after litigation commenced, on August 31, 2009, NY A

purported to make an Extension Payment (the "Disputed Extension Payment").
The Disputed Extension Payment was accompanied by a three-page letter from
NY A's counsel outlining NYA's interpretation of the REPC (the "August 31
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Letter").

(R.116-18 (a copy of the Letter from K. Kelly to M. Gaylord et al.,

dated August 31, 2009 ("August 31 Letter") is attached to the addendum as
Exhibit 8).) It made acceptance of the Disputed Extension Payment contingent on
the Harrisons' acceptance of NYA's interpretation as set forth in the Amended
Complaint. (R.116-18; August 31 Letter.)
NYA's Response:

Harrisons mischaracterize the letter which (1) did not

outline NYA's interpretation of the REPC but rather stated the reasons for the right to
extend and for the Second Addendum; and (2) instead stated that acceptance of the
check was acknowledgement of NYA's right to continue to extend the closing in
accordance with the express terms of the REPC and added no new conditions to
acceptance of the earnest money deposit payment.
20.

In the August 31 Letter, NYA set forth its understanding of the terms of

the REPC as follows:
[Harrisons' quoted portion of the letter is omitted herein.]
NYA's Response: Harrisons mischaracterize the August 31 Letter which did not

state NYA's understanding of the REPC but rather stated NYA's understanding of the
reasons for the right to extend and for the Second Addendum.
26.

On June 14, 2012, the Court issued a Ruling on Cross Motions for

Summary Judgment ("Ruling").

(R.384-401.) The Harrisons appeal this Ruling

and related Order, which held among other things, that:
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(a) Because NYA could extend the contract at its discretion, it did
not deprive the Harrisons of the fruit of the contract when it exercised its
discretion. (R.387-88.)
(b) NYA was not required to purchase the Property within a
reasonable time because the REPC permitted it to exercise its discretion to
extend closing indefinitely. (R.386-87.)
(c) The Disputed Extension Payment constituted valid tender because
the letter accompanying the payment contained only

conditions the

Harrisons had agreed to when they permitted NYA to extend closing at its
discretion. (R.389-91.)

NYA's Response: Contrary to Harrisons' mischaracterization of its ruling,
the trial court ruled that:
(a) Because the REPC granted NYA the right to extensions according to its
discretion that to find NYA in breach would be inconsistent with the express terms of
the REPC and would enforce duties to which the parties didn't agree. (R3 87-8)
(b) Because the REPC included a specific closing date subject to extensions
that the court could not impose a reasonable time for closing (R393). The REPC does
not limit the number of extensions to which NY A is entitled (R392-3, 386-7)
(c) Because the REPC permitted extensions in NYA's sole discretion, the
letter setting out the reasons for extending were irrelevant and do not add additional
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terms to the contract but only contain conditions on which NYA already had the right
to insist. (R389-390)

NYA'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 10, 2006, NYA, as buyer, and Harrisons, as sellers, entered

into a Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land and Addendum No. 1 ("REPC") to
purchase 20.27 acres of real property located in Springville, Utah (the "Property").
(R.40-41, ,r 7,8, and 10, REPC and Addendum No. 1 attached as Exhibit 2 .)
2.

G

Addendum No. 1 set the settlement deadline to be 180 days from the date

of the fully executed contract and permitted NYA, in its sole discretion, to choose to pay

G

an additional amount of non refundable earnest money at the rate of $12,500 per month to
extend the contract monthly beyond the set settlement date. (R.24, Addendum No. 1 ,r,r 3
andl0)

3.

Less than two weeks later, on November 22, 2006, the parties entered into

a second addendum modifying the REPC ("Addendum No. 2"). (R.39,
Addendum No. 2 (attached to the addendum as Exhibit 3)

,r15;

Among other things,

Addendum No. 2, the settlement deadline to October 31, 2007, and reduced the
additional earnest money deposits to be paid for monthly extensions of the
settlement deadline to $6,250 per month. (R.21, Addendum No. 2
4.

,r 4-5)

In October, 2007 NYA began making additional monthly earnest money

deposits and continued making such additional monthly earnest money deposits until after
Harrisons rejected and returned the August 31, 2009 earnest money deposit. (R24 l-242).
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G

5.

On March 5, 2009, Harrisons notified NYA that "any reasonable time for

closing has already passed" and that NYA's failure to close was "a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Harrisons stated that notwithstanding NYA's
breach that Harrisons were willing to close on or before August 5, 2009, but that if NYA
did not close, Harrisons reserved their rights and remedies in the REPC. (R.124-125,
March 5 Letter attached to Addendum as Exhibit 4). Contrary to Harrisons' Factual
Background, the March 5th letter does not invite NYA to propose a reasonable settlement
deadline. Nor was NYA obligated to close within a reasonable time. ((R. 24, Addendum
No. 113, 10, R. 21, Addendum No.2 ,r 4-5)
6.

On June 24, 2009, NYA filed an amended complaint against Harrisons for

rescission, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment. (R.21-41.) On July 27, 2009,
Harrisons filed their answer and counterclaim for breach of contract and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in which Harrisons asserted that NYA had
breached the REPC and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to close
within a reasonable time. (R.42-5 8.)
7.

NYA continued to make and Harri sons continued to accept NYA's

additional monthly earnest money deposits through July, 2009. (R.241-242)
8.

On August 31, 2009, NY A tendered an additional monthly earnest

money deposit (the "Rejected Payment") accompanied by NY A's counsel's letter (the
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"August 31 Letter"). (R. 116-18 (a copy of the August 31, 2009 Letter from K. Kelly

to M. Gaylord ("August 31 Letter") is attached to the addendum as Exhibit 5 ).
9.

Even though the REPC allowed NYA to extend the settlement date in its

sole discretion, the August 31 Letter set forth NYA's understanding of the reasons for
NYA's extension right and the reduction in the monthly earnest money deposits. NYA's
understanding and reasons were that the purchase price was based on the ability of NYA
to develop the Property, the availability of the sewer line and storm drainage capacity,
and the ability to extend the closing date was to allow postponement until it was
economically feasible to develop the Property and so it could be developed to maximum
potential. (R. 116-18; August 31 Letter.)
10.

Because Harrisons previously demanded August 5, 2009 closing date had

passed, the August 31 Letter sought acknowledgement of NYA's continued right to
extend the closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC, in its sole
discretion, by making monthly payments of additional earnest money stating:
By negotiating this $6,250 check, you are agreeing with my client
that it is entitled under the REPC to make these payments in order to
postpone closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC
until it is economically feasible to move forward with a residential
development of the property as discussed above, including in
paragraphs (a) through (d). My client is simply seeking the benefit of
its bargain under the REPC, and nothing more - in light of you claims
that my client may not now close under the REPC. Nothing in this
letter should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or
benefits other than those provided under the REPC.
(R.116; August 31 Letter at 3 .)
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11.
v:J

The Harrisons rejected the Rejected Payment and returned the check to

NY A's counsel. (R. 114-15 (September 2, 2009 Letter from J. Boren to K. Kelly,
("September 2 Letter")) attached to the addendum as Exhibit 6)
12.

Although the REPC permitted NYA to monthly extend the settlement

deadline in its "sole discretion", Harrisons claimed that NY A was attempting to
modify the terms of the REPC.

Harrisons further stated that the tender of the

Rejected Payment with the requested acknowledgement from Harrisons of NY A's
right to extend the settlement date on a monthly basis under the express terms of the
vJ

REPC constituted an inappropriate condition to the tender and an additional breach
of the REPC and demanded that NYA withdraw what they characterized as "your
inappropriate conditions." (R.114-15 September 2 Letter).
13.

Because Harrisons improperly rejected the Rejected Payment and breached

the REPC, NYA did not make any subsequent monthly additional earnest money
deposits. (R.190, 241)
14.

NYA paid an initial earnest money deposit of $10,000.00 and between

October, 2007 and July, 2009, had paid additional earnest money deposits of
$137,503.00. (R.283)
15.

In late 2011 and early 2012, NYA and Harrisons cross-moved for summary

judgment. (Harrisons' motion for summary judgment (R.110-80. ); NYA's opposition
(R.192-224 ); and Harrisons' reply (R.229-65).
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NYA's cross-motion for partial

summary judgment (R.290-319.); Harrisons' opposition (R.325-51) and NYA's reply
(R.352-82)).
16.

W

On June 14, 2012, the Court issued a Ruling on Cross Motions for

Summary Judgment ("2012 Ruling"). (R.384-401) and on December 31, 2012 entered
an Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("2012 Order"). (R.508-510). (2012
Ruling and 2012 Order Attached to Addendum as Exhibit 7)
17.

On January 22, 2013, Harrisons filed a motion to reconsider the 2012

Ruling and 2012 Order which was responded to by NYA.
18.

On July 5, 2013, the Court issued a Ruling on Motion to Reconsider

(R. 700-704) and on October 18, 2013 entered an Order on Harrisons' Motion to
Reconsider (R. 721-725). (Ruling and Order on Motion to Reconsider attached to
Addendum as Exhibit 8)
19.

On December 13, 2013, NYA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for

Damages and Liquidated Damages (R.728-762) in which NYA sought its contractual
damages consisting of the return of the $147,503.00 earnest money deposits which it had
made, liquidated damages in an amount equal to its $147,503.00 earnest money deposits,
prejudgment interest on the earnest money deposits from the date each payment was
made, interest on the liquidated damages amount from August 31, 2009 (the date of
Harrisons' breach) and its costs and attorneys fees. Harrisons' opposition (R766-797),
and NYA's Reply (R.802-852).
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20.
vJ

On May 30, 2014, the Court entered its Ruling on Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Damages (R863-870) (attached to addendum as Exhibit 9). On
July 1, 2014, the Court entered its Order and Judgment on NYA's Motion for Summary
Judgment for Damages ("July 2014 Order") (R.921-924 attached to addendum as Exhibit
10). NYA was awarded the return of its initial and additional earnest money deposits in
the amount of $147,503.00, interest on the earnest money deposits from August 31, 2009,
the date of Harrisons' breach, attorneys fees of $59,607.25, and court costs of $360.00.
NYA was not awarded any liquidated damages.
21.

On July 7, 2014, NYA filed its Motion to Amend Order and Judgment as to

Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R.927-939). Harrisons' Opposition
(R.947-987); and NYA's Reply Memorandum (R.991-1006).
23.

On October 24, 2014, the Court entered its Ruling on Motion to Amend

Order and Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorney Fee Award (R10681072). On November 18, 2014 entered its Order and Judgment on NYA's Motion to
Amend Order and Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award
(R.1080-1082).

{The Order and Judgment are attached as Exhibit 11)

The Court

augmented the attorney fee award from $59,607.25 to $67,629.25 and thereby increased
the total judgment to $286,495.75.
24.

On August 6, 2014, NY A filed a Notice of Cross Appeal (R.l010-1011 ).

The Notice of Cross Appeal appealed the portion of the July 2014 Order which
determined that NYA was not entitled to its liquidated damages, failed to grant NY A its
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attorneys fees with respect to the liquidated damages as well as other attorneys fees that
were not awarded, and failed to award NYA interest to which it was entitled.
25.

On November 20, 2014, NYA filed a Notice of Amended or Supplemental

Cross Appeal (R. l 083-1085) which amended or supplemented its earlier cross appeal
because the Court failed in the November 18, 2014 Order to award NYA certain of its
additional attorneys fees including those associated with its damages and liquidated
damages claims.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the Real Estate Purchase Contract had a specific date for performance

0

which could be extended at NYA's sole discretion on a monthly basis to subsequent
specific dates, NYA was not required to close the purchase within a reasonable time
demanded by the Harrisons.

Despite the fact that NYA had the right to extend the

settlement date on a monthly basis in its sole discretion upon payment of additional
earnest money, Harrisons claim that NYA's failure to close within a reasonable time
constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the
implied covenant cannot be read to establish new independent rights to which the parties
did not agree, cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with the express contractual
terms cannot compel a party to exercise a right to its own detriment to benefit the other
party, nor to comport with the court's sense of justice but which is inconsistent with the
terms of the contract. To hold that NYA was in breach of the covenant for failing to
close within a reasonable time would be inconsistent with the terms of the REPC and the
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other principles of the implied covenant. In addition, the agreed purpose for NYA's
purchase of the property was for development and the justified expectations of the parties
were that NYA would purchase the property for and when it was able to develop the
property. Although NYA had sole discretion to extend the closing date for the property,
the exercise of its discretion to extend the closing until the property could be developed
was for a purpose reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. There was no
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in NYA's extensions of the
closing date.
NYA's tender of the August 31, 2009 Rejected Payment to Harrisons with a letter
requesting that Harrisons acknowledge that NYA was entitled to continue to extend the
settlement deadline under the express terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract did not
impose any new or additional conditions and was a valid tender. Since NYA was entitled
to extend the settlement date at its sole discretion, an explanation as to its reasons for the
exercise of its discretion did not obligate the Harrisons to any new or additional terms
than those to which they were already obligated under the Real Estate Purchase Contract.
Harrisons' rejection and return of the Rejected Payment constituted a breach of the
Real Estate Purchase Contract which excused NYA's further performance under the Real
Estate Purchase Contract and entitled NYA to its contractual remedies including the
return of the earnest money deposits it had paid.

The REPC did not impose any

requirement for notification to or demand from Harrisons of liquidated damages under
the REPC in order to elect to pursue liquidated damages. NYA did not elect to pursue
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actual damages, but elected to pursue and is entitled to recover liquidated damages from
Harri sons.
NYA is entitled to an award of additional attorney's fees for time spent on
research regardless of whether the items of research are designated because Utah case
law has not required that level of specificity as to the work performed, is entitled to
attorney's fees associated with its liquidated damages claims because it is entitled to
recover such liquidated damages from Harrisons and is entitled to its attorney's fees on
appeal.
In accordance with Anderson, Supra, NYA is entitled to pre-judgment interest on
its earnest money deposits from the date of each payment to Harrisons, not just from the
date of Harri sons' breach. NYA is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on its liquidated
damages from the date of Harri sons' breach. The interest rate is 10% per annum as
provided by UTAH CODE ANN. §15-1-1{2).

ARGUMENT

I.

NYA DID NOT VIOLATE THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING WHEN IT EXERCISED ITS EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL
RIGHTS
The district court correctly ruled that NYA did not breach the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing in exercising its express right under the REPC to extend the
settlement date monthly by paying additional earnest money deposits.
The underlying principle of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was stated in Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, ,14, 94 P.3d 193 as follows:
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Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both parties to a contract
impliedly promise not to intentionally do anything to injure the other
party's rights to receive the benefits of the contract.
Further as stated in US Fid. v. US Sports Specialty, 2012 UT 3, ,r20, 270 P.3d 464 the
covenant requires the parties "to act consistently with the agreed purpose and the justified
expectations of the other party."
"To determine the purpose, intentions and expectations of the parties, we consider
the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties."
Cook Assocs. v. Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284, ,r29,
243 P.3d 888. It is well settled that "[w]here the language within the four comers of the
contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of
the contractual language ... " Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT
27, ,25, 207 P.3d 1235. Because courts want to give effect to the parties' intentions as
expressed in the contract, they should not rewrite the parties' agreement for them. Hidden
Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737, 739 {Utah 1973). "The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing performs a significant but perilous role in the law of contracts
... yet the judicial inference of contract terms is also fraught with peril, as its misuse
threatens 'commercial certainty and breed[s] costly litigation." Young Living Essential
Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, ,rs, 266 P .3d 814 (Utah 2011) The courts have also stated
that they will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a
better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d
950, 954 (Utah 1998). In light of these concerns, significant limitations are imposed on
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the implied covenant. In Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,Il9, 173 P.3d 865, the
Court of Appeals described those limitations as follows:
However, the application of the covenant is limited by some general
principles:
First, this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights
or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Second, this
covenant cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with express
contractual terms. Third, this covenant cannot compel a contractual
party to exercise a contractual right "to its own detriment for the
purpose of benefitting another party to the contract." Finally, we will
not use this covenant to achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's
sense of justice but inconsistent with the express terms of the applicable
contract.
Finally, "There is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party
is simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube Ctr. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 798
(Utah App. 1997).
Harrisons asserted that NYA breached the implied covenant because it failed to
close by a date unilaterally and arbitrarily selected by Harrisons and which they
characterize as a reasonable time. However, the REPC itself provides that the property
was being purchased for development. See REPC

1 1.2, Addendum

1,

1 2,

7, and 8,

and Addendum 2, 1 1. Consistent with intended development, Addendum 1 1 10 also
provided that NYA had the discretion to pay an additional amount of non-refundable
earnest money in order to extend the settlement deadline on a monthly basis.
Addendum I contained no limitation of the number of NYA's extensions. Within two
weeks of the signing of the REPC and Addendum 1, NYA discovered a problem with
sewer line availability. NYA informed Harri sons that NYA was not going to be able to
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develop the property as planned and it might be sometime before it could be developed.
As a result of those discussions, Addendum 2 was executed which extended the
settlement date to October 31, 2007 and reduced the amount of the additional earnest
money deposits to be paid for monthly settlement extensions.

(See Answers to

Interrogatories Pages 4-6, 10-12, and 18-22). Again, Addendum 2 had no limitation on
the number of NYA's extensions of the settlement date. Nor did the parties include a
back-end or drop dead date by which NYA would have to close.
Harrisons' assertion that NYA's failure to close by a "reasonable" date violates the
limitations and restrictions of the implied covenant.

Their assertion establishes new

rights and duties to which the parties had not agreed, namely the obligation for NYA to
close within a reasonable time and the right of Harrisons to demand such closing.

The

assertion creates rights which are inconsistent with the express contractual terms of the
REPC, namely NY A's right to monthly extend the settlement date by payment of
additional earnest money without limitation as to the number of such extensions and
without a backend or drop dead date. It compels NYA not to exercise its right to extend
the settlement deadline to NYA's detriment in order to benefit Harrisons. Finally, and
authoritatively, there can be no violation of the duty of good faith where NYA is
exercising its express contractual right to extend the closing date.

The trial court

correctly ruled that there was no breach of the implied covenant by NYA.
The express terms of the REPC, establish NYA's right to extend the
settlement date. Its contractually permitted extensions of the settlement date were not
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breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court correctly
granted NYA's summary judgment motion that it had not breached such covenant.
Harrisons argue that because NYA had the right to extend the REPC in its sole
discretion, and that no express standard for its exercise is stated, that the covenant
imposes an objective standard of reasonableness which the Harrisons argue means that
NYA was required to close the purchase within a reasonable time. Harrisons' argument
is not supported by Utah law.
It is true that Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,I20, 84 P.3d

1154 stated that:
The degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the
covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined
their expectations and imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion
through express contract terms.
But the Markham, supra court in ,r34 described the permitted purposes for exercise of
discretion as follows:
The good faith performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise of
discretion for any purpose-including ordinary business purposesreasonably within the contemplation of the parties. A contract thus would
be breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its
discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range-a reason beyond
the risks assumed by the party claiming the breach.
But Harrisons do not invoke the implied duty to refrain NYA from actions that
will intentionally destroy or injure Harrisons' right to receive the fruits of their contract,
instead they seek to impose a new covenant on NYA, namely the obligation to close
within a reasonable time. The courts "have set a high bar for the invocation of a new
covenant." Young Living, 2011 UT 64, ,IIO and have further stated:
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. . . the court may recognize a covenant of good faith and fair dealing where it is
clear from the parties' "course of dealing" or a settled custom or usage of trade
that the parties undoubtedly would have agreed to the covenant if they had
considered and addressed it Id. 143. No such covenant may be invoked, however,
if it would create obligations "inconsistent with express contractual terms" Id. 145.
... Where the court adopts a covenant enshrined in a settled custom or usage of
trade, it is simply endorsing a universal standard that the parties would doubtless
have adopted if they had thought to address it by contract. Where the parties
themselves have agreed to terms that address the circumstance that gave rise to
their dispute, by contrast, the court has no business injecting its own sense of what
amounts to "fair dealing."
Even the course of dealing and conduct of the parties indisputably show that NYA's
extensions of the settlement date were consistent with the agreed purpose and justified
expectations of the parties and therefore cannot be breaches of the implied covenant.
Harrisons simplify the alleged intent and expectations of the parties to the
statement that the parties entered into a purchase contract and not an option contract or a
seller financed purchase and that NYA breached such expectations by not closing within
the "reasonable" time set, post- execution, by Harrisons. However, from the REPC and
the communications and conduct of the parties, it is clear that the agreed purpose and
the justified expectations of the parties were that NYA was purchasing the property for
development. NYA could extend the closing date in its discretion. There were no
limitations to the number ofNYA's extensions in either Addendum. There was no back
end or drop dead date in the REPC. There were no restrictions or limits on the reasons
for NYA to make any such extensions. Their justified expectation was that NYA would
not close the purchase until such development was feasible, as it determined.
The parties conduct and communications also were consistent with there being no
limitations on the number of extensions and the justified expectation that the purchase
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would not occur until development was feasible. In the January, 2007 and September
2007 letters, Mr. Kelly separately informed Harrisons about the development progress
and informed the Harrisons that he would begin making the monthly payments and make
them until NYA closed on the property. (See January and September 2007 letters. RI 69152). Nothing in either letter limited the number ofNYA's extensions or indicated that
NYA intended to close before the property could be developed or to close within a
"reasonable time". Harrisons did not object to either of NYA's letters.
Harrisons presented no evidence in conjunction with either cross-motion for
summary judgment disputing that the number of settlement extensions were unlimited.
Nor that prior to the initial October, 2007 settlement date, it was their intent or
expectation that closing would occur prior to when the property was developed or within
a "reasonable" time. Harrisons are presumed to know Utah law and that where a REPC
provides a specific date for performance, such as closing, that a reasonable time for
perfonnance cannot be imposed by a court. See discussion below. Harrisons cannot have
had a justified expectation that the closing would occur within a "reasonable" time.
Harrisons presented no facts or evidence of a course of dealing between them or of a
settled custom that shows that parties would undoubtedly have limited the number of
extensions, that they would have required NYA to close within a reasonable time, or
included a drop dead date to close. As stated in Young, where the parties themselves
agreed to the terms of the REPC which specifically address the dispute namely, terms of
extension of the settlement date, the "court has no business injecting its own sense of
what amounts to 'fair dealing.'" Young Living, 2011 UT 64,
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in 0.

In contrast, the REPC,

NYA's letters and the other evidence are consistent with the parties agreed purpose and
~

justified expectations, that NYA could and would extend the settlement date until the
Property could be developed. Consistent with the REPC and his word NYA commenced
making the monthly payments on October 31, 2007 and continued making accepted
monthly payments until rejected.
From the undisputed facts, it is clear that the agreed common purpose and
justified expectations of the parties were that NYA would purchase the property for
NYA's development purposes, that NYA could extend the settlement deadline by the
monthly payment of additional earnest money deposits, that NYA would not close and
would not be required to close the purchase until NYA could develop the property. There
was no agreed purpose or justified expectation that NYA's extensions would be limited
nor that NYA would close within a reasonable time. NYA's exercise of its discretion to
extend the settlement date until the Property could be developed was within the "ordinary
business purposes reasonably within the contemplation of the parties." NYA's exercise of
its discretion to extend the settlement date until the property could be developed was not
"outside the contemplated range" nor "a reason beyond the risks assumed by" Harrisons.
Markham, 2007 UT App 379, ,34.
Ironically, it is Harrisons who breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
when, after accepting NYA's additional earnest money deposits for nearly two years,
they demanded that NYA close the purchase by their unilaterally and arbitrarily
designated August 5, 2009 date in direct contravention of the express contractual terms.
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The district court correctly ruled that it was not a violation of the covenant good
faith and fair dealing for NYA to exercise its discretion to extend the REPC in
accordance with the express terms of the REPC. There was no violation of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, as a matter of law, because NYA was simply exercising its
contractual rights. (R 701, quoting PDQ Lube, 949 P.2d at 798). This Court should
affirm the district court's ruling and order denying Harri sons' motion and confirming that
NYA did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 2 •
II.

(~\
\iij;,I

THE REPC SPECIFICALLY STATED THE TIME FOR NYA'S
PERFORMANCE AND THE COURT CAN NOT IMPLY A REASONABLE
TIME NOR LIMIT THE NUMBER OF EXTENSIONS

"(I]f the language within ... the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language,"
Green River, 2003 UT 50, ~17. Furthermore, because courts are to give effect to the
parties' intentions as expressed in the contract, courts should not rewrite the parties'
agreement. "[A] contract should be reformed only when its terms are so vague that the
intention of the parties cannot be ascertained therefrom." Hidden Meadows, 511 P .2d at

Utah law is clear that "when a contract specifically states the time for its
performance, it is plain error to allow it to be performed within a reasonable time. A court
may allow a contract to be perfonned within a reasonable time only when the contract is
silent as to the time for its performance." Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah

2

If the court were to determine that there may be a breach of such covenant despite NY A
merely exercising its contractual rights, then there are disputed issues of fact which
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1986). Coulter & Smith, 966 P.2d at 858. In contracts where time is of the essence "the
stipulation of the contract must be exactly complied with." Roberts v. Braffett, 92 P. 789,
793 (Utah 1907). It is only "where a contract or conveyance expresses no time for the

performance of an act contemplated by such contract or conveyance, a reasonable time is
implied." Salt Lake City v. State, 125 P .2d 790, 793 (Utah 1942) ( emphasis added).
The REPC and addenda explicitly provide the specific time for settlement namely
October 31, 2007. NYA had the option to pay additional earnest money to extend such
specific settlement date. IfNYA paid additional earnest money, settlement was extended
for one month to the end of the next calendar month. Settlement would be extended to
the end of each successive month as additional earnest money deposits were made by
NYA. At all times, the REPC stated a specific time for NYA's performance. There is no
ambiguity regarding the settlement date or its extension to another specific settlement
date.

Accordingly, neither Harrisons nor the court can imply a reasonable time for

NYA's performance. There is no ambiguity that the REPC provided for an unlimited
number ofNYA's extensions. The court cannot reform the REPC to limit the number of
NYA's extensions.
Harrisons assert that NY A's right to extend the specific settlement date by making
monthly payments does not make the time for performance definite or specific and that
the court should have imposed a reasonable time for performance. Harrisons have cited
no cases that the ability of a party to extend, or repeatedly extend the time of
perfonnance, in particular the closing date, to another specific date means that the

would preclude the court from granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
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contract has no specific time for performance or that a reasonable time for performance
may be imposed. NYA is unaware of any such case.
The court is referred to Hidden Meadows. supra. which involved an option
agreement that provided: "This contract is automatically renewed from year to year
unless notice of cancellation is given by either party prior to October I of any year." The
court interpreted the contract to mean that if no notice of termination was given by
October I, 1970, it would be extended for the following year, and so on. There were no
limitations in the agreement as to how many times the option could be extended. The
Court held that "in the contract under consideration in this matter we think the language
is clear, certain, definite, and unambiguous. As the judge said, there is no need for
reformation." Id. at 739. Even though the option agreement continued year by year, the

Hidden Meadows court did not impose a requirement that closing occur within a
reasonable time, nor limit the number of extensions.
Because the REPC clearly and unambiguously set a specific date for settlement
and for monthly extensions of such date to subsequent specific dates for performance,
neither Harrisons nor the Court may impose a reasonable date for NYA's closing of the
purchase. This Court should affirm the district court's ruling denying the Harrisons'
Motion for Summary Judgment and hold that Harrisons could not impose a reasonable
time for closing.
Even if the court could impose a reasonable time for closing, Utah law is that the
determination of what is a reasonable time is a question of fact that could not be decided
by the trial court on summary judgment nor by this court on appeal. "[W]hat is
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reasonable is a question of fact." Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 860 {Utah 1979).
"[W]hat is a reasonable time under the circumstances ... is a factual determination"
Coulter & Smith, 966 P .2d at 858. It is only "if the facts are undisputed, the question is
one of law for the court. If the facts are in dispute and the question rests on inference, it is
one of fact." Salt Lake City, 125 P .2d at 793.
Harrisons assert that IHC Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73 {Utah 2008)
allows the court to determine a reasonable time as a matter of law. However, IHC did not
involve a reasonable time, but a waiver and even then the court applied the summary
judgment standard to only permit such determination if the facts were undisputed.
Harrisons also cite to Contimortgage Corp. v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 575,
578 (E.D. Pa. 1999) that the court may decide what is a reasonable time as a matter of
law.

Such case has no precedential value in Utah since it is a Pennsylvania federal

district court. More importantly, the case does not stand for the Harrisons' assertion. The

Contimortgage court stated it could only make determination of a reasonable time for
performance as a matter of law in a recurring commercial transaction that happened in the
same way and with the same data day after day. Id The instant case does not involve
,..J

such recurring circumstance.
Harrisons argue that a reasonable time for NYA's performance had and that NYA
breached by failure to close by August 5, 2009 which they asserted was a reasonable time
as a matter of law. In their brief Harrisons now identify five "undisputed" facts that they
assert enable the court as a matter of law to determine NYA's breach for failure to close b
August 5, 2009. NYA has disputed that Harrisons' arbitrarily designated August 5, 2009
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closing date was a reasonable time to close and that NYA was in breach in failing to so
close in their response to Harrisons' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court is

referred to such response for more detail as to its dispute of Harrisons' facts. (R212-224,
202-207)

It is clear from the five facts cited by Harrisons in their brief that the court cannot
decide as a matter of law what a reasonable time for closing is or that NYA breached by
failing to close by August 5, 2009: (1) The parties agreed to an October 31, 2007 closing

W

date and an unlimited number of NYA's extensions. Such specific dates, do not mean
August 5, 2009 was a reasonable date but preclude Harrisons from imposing a reasonable
time to close: (2) NYA's letter indicating that closing shouldn't be too far in the future.
Such letter and statement were not incorporated into the REPC and do not modify it: (3)
NYA did not terminate the REPC during the due diligence period. This fact is irrelevant
since the REPC provided the ability to extend closing to accommodate the sewer
installation. (4) Harri sons notified NYA in March, 2009 that they would have to close by
August 5, 2009 which Harrisons assert gave NYA a reasonable time to pull financing
together and to close. Harrisons raise for the first time, without any factual support, that
the 5 months was sufficient to secure financing. It is also irrelevant since the purchase
was dependent on development of the property, not financing. (5) time is of the essence
of the REPC. This fact is irrelevant because of the extension right. From such limited
facts, the court could not determine a reasonable time for performance based on the
totality of the circumstances. Moreover, none of such provisions address in any way
NYA's clearly manifested intent to purchase the property for development and the
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identified issues and difficulties of such development which would affect the
reasonableness of any closing date.
Even if the Court were to determine that a reasonable time for performance could
be imposed on NYA, disputed issues of fact precluded the trial court and this court from
determining as a matter of law that August 5, 2009 was a reasonable time for NYA's
performance or that NYA breached by failing to close by such date. The court should
deny that Harrisons' appeal that NYA was required to close within a reasonable time.

III.

THE AUGUST 2009 EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT WAS VALIDLY
TENDERED
The district court correctly ruled that the tender of the August 2009 earnest money

deposit was unconditional because it contained only conditions upon which NYA already
had a right to insist. "A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which the
tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 974 (Utah
1954). "The tender cannot impose on the other party a new condition or requirement not
already imposed by the contract.. .. A party to a bilateral contract may, however, properly
condition a tender on the other's performance, since such a condition does not impose a
requirement beyond that already contained in the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Fin.
Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992). The focus is whether the tender demands
"new" or "additional" obligations or merely demands performance of what the other
party was already required to do.
When NYA tendered the Rejected Payment, it merely demanded perfonnance
already required of Harrisons under the REPC.
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The August 31 Letter sought

acknowledgement from Harrisons of NYA's continued right to extend the closing in
accordance with the express terms of the REPC by making monthly payments of
additional earnest money. Harrisons would then fulfill their obligations under the REPC
by accepting NYA's earnest money deposits and extending the closing. Requesting
acknowledgment from Harrisons that they would continue to comply with the REPC
cannot be deemed an additional or new condition that would render NYA's tender
conditional or invalid. The August 31 Letter specifically stated "Nothing in this letter
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should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other than
those provided under the REPC." This statement made it abundantly clear that NYA
was not imposing any new or additional conditions. It was reasonable for NYA to seek
such confirmation after the Harrisons claimed NYA was in breach of the REPC, and
demanded that NYA close by August 5, 2009.
Harrisons assert that NYA's tender was invalid and imposed additional conditions
because the REPC was silent as to the economic feasibility of development of the
property, the availability of the sewer line and storm drain capacity but the Letter
included terms not expressly stated in the REPC. Harrisons' assertion is hypertechnical
and their focus wrong. The correct analysis is not whether the words of the tender letter
were included in the REPC but whether the tender imposed additional obligations on
Harrisons. It did not. The REPC permitted NYA to extend the settlement date in its sole
discretion upon payment of the agreed additional earnest money deposit with no
restriction as to the reason. Because NYA could extend the settlement in its discretion by
making payment, it was unnecessary to specify the reasons or basis for the extension and
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could extend without a stated reason. If the agreed additional earnest money deposit was
timely paid, Harrisons were obligated to accept it and extend the settlement date for one
month. Since the REPC granted NYA an unlimited number of extensions and did not
restrict the reasons for extension, the letter did not impose any new or additional
obligation or condition by requesting acknowledgement of NYA's continued right to
extend until it was economically feasible to the develop the property, consistent with
sewer line availability and storm drain capacity.

Harrisons incorrectly argue that

acceptance would have waived their claims for a reasonable time to close or breach of the
implied covenant. But in reality Harrisons had no such claims anyway. NYA's seeking
of confirmation of its right to extend until such development circumstances occurred was
actually consistent with the agreed purpose and justified expectations of the parties.
Harrisons argue that because NYA included an explanation its actions in extending the
contract pursuant to the express terms of the contract, NYA's tender is invalid. Under
Harrisons' analysis, had NYA simply sent a one line letter extending the settlement date
with a check it would have been acceptable tender, but in explaining its thinking for
making the election to extend, NYA rendered the tender conditional and invalid. The
illogic of Harrisons' position is clear.

NYA's tender did not impose any new or

additional conditions or terms not already imposed by the REPC and did not violate
Harri sons' rights under the implied covenant.
Harrisons assert that they were required to object to NYA's tender or waive any
such objection under

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-5-802(3). Such section is inapplicable. It

applies to written offers to pay a sum of money, deliver a written instrument or specific
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personal property (UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-5-802(1)). The person to whom tendered is
to specify any objection to the amount of money, terms of the written instrument or the

~

amount or kind of property. The section does not apply to the terms or conditions under
which the written instrument is tendered.
G

Harrisons misstate or mischaracterize Century 21 All W. Real Estate & Inv. v.
Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982) that the buyers had not made a valid tender because they
insisted that the sellers accept their interpretation of their contract's requirements. The
contract provided that mortgages and encumbrances were to be paid by the seller, but
there was a dispute as to whether seller had an obligation to remove a Citicorp
encumbrance prior to closing. However, the Court's holding was actually that a letter
asserting that the buyer was "ready and willing to close" the transaction, particularly
when buyer had asserted, without contractual support, that the Citicorp encumbrance be
satisfied before closing, was not a tender let alone an unconditional tender of buyer's
money or payment obligation.
NYA's tender of the Rejected Payment was timely, was consistent with Harrisons'
existing obligations under the REPC and was unconditional. Harrisons breached the
REPC by reject the Rejected Payment. This Court should affinn the district court's
ruling that NYA's tender of the Rejected Payment was valid and that Harri sons breached
the REPC by refusing to accept such tender.
IV.

HARRISONS FAILED TO PERFORM WHEN THEY REFUSED TO
ACCEPT NYA'S TIMELY EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT AND EXTEND
CLOSING.
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The court found that Harrisons had breached the REPC by their refusal of NYA's
valid tender. Harrisons confuse their actual breach of the REPC with an anticipatory
breach. "[A] party's refusal to perform under the terms of an agreement constitutes a
breach of that agreement."

Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992).

Harrisons had a contractual obligation to accept the timely tender of the Rejected
Payment and to extend the settlement deadline.
Payment and returned it to NYA.

Instead they rejected the Rejected

Harrisons make the nonsensical argument that

Harrisons "never refused to extend the closing deadline, only to accept the $6,250
payment to do so." They also allege that Harrisons did not repudiate their obligation to
sell the Property to NYA within 30 days. Harrisons assertion is false. The tender of the
Rejected Payment was to extend the closing date an additional 30 days and not have to
immediately close. Harrisons did not extend the settlement date. They repudiated their
obligation to sell asserting in the September 2009 letter that NYA's failure to validly
tender the Rejected Payment constituted another breach of the REPC for which Harrisons
would amend their pleadings.

Harrisons subsequently filed for summary judgment

asserting that NYA's tender of the Rejected Payment was a breach of the REPC and that
Harrisons were entitled to retain the earnest money.
In contrast to a breach, an anticipatory breach is committed before the time of
performance when a party manifests a positive and unequivocal not to render its
promised performance.

Id. Harrisons have asserted that their refusal to accept the

Rejected Payment was not such a positive or unequivocal manifestation of their intent.
However, such principle applies to anticipatory breaches and not to actual breaches.
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Their breach consisted of their then present refusal to perform their obligations under the
REPC. Their claimed manifestation of intent to perform is irrelevant once they have
actually breached by rejecting NYA's tender.

The court correctly determined that

Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing to accept NYA's valid tender.
It is well settled law that a "material breach by one party to a contract excuses further
performance by the nonbreaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d
295, 301 {Utah App. 1994). The first party to substantially or materially breach "cannot

~

complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform." CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 116 P.3d
366, 373 {Utah 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Harrisons were the first party to
breach the REPC by their rejection of the Rejected Payment and cannot complain if NYA
thereafter doesn't perform by making additional earnest money deposits or by closing the
purchase.
Because NYA's additional earnest money deposit was timely made and was
consistent with the terms of the REPC, Harrisons materially breached the REPC by
rejecting it and refusing to extend the closing. This Court should affirm the district
court's ruling that Harrisons materially breached the REPC by refusing to accept NYA's
valid tender of the August 31, 2009 Rejected Payment, returning it to NYA and refusing
to extend the closing.

V.

THE HARRISONS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE
MATERIALITY OF THEIR BREACH OF THE REPC.

ISSUE

OF

For the first time on appeal Harrisons raise the issue that their breach in rejecting
the Rejected Payment was not a material breach. It is well settled that "to properly
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preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised in the district court ... .the
issue must be specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence
and relevant legal authority." Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ,I20, 266 P.3d 839.
Harrisons have never raised the issue of the materiality of their breach in rejecting the
Rejected Payment, in any motion or otherwise. The issue has not been preserved for
appeal.
Strangely Harrisons' assertion is apparently based in part on the amount of the
$6,250 Rejected Payment in relation to the $3,000,000 purchase price. It is unclear how
rejection of a $6,250 payment regardless of the purchase price can be immaterial.
Applying Harrisons apparent logic, that the $6,250 payment and its refusal was not
material in light of the $3,000,000, NYA should not have had to tender the payment at all
to secure the thirty day extension it desired, and any failure by NYA to tender what
Harrisons now claim is an immaterial amount could not have been a breach by NYA.
Obviously, Harrisons' logic is nonsensical.
Regardless, Harrisons' assertion that their breach was not material is wrong.
Without going into all of the factors of a material breach, since this issue was not
previously raised by Harri sons and would be a question of fact anyway, their breach was
clearly material. NYA contracted for the right to monthly pay additional earnest money
to extend settlement and the closing. The settlement date and the right to extend it were
substantial and material provisions of and crucial components of the REPC. NYA would
be and was deprived of such benefits as a result of Harri sons' breach. Harrisons cannot
now attempt to ignore the importance of the tender and rejection of the Rejected Payment
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in order to claim that their breach was not material. Their current position is inconsistent
with their position throughout the lawsuit. Harrisons rejection of the Rejected Payment

CJ

was a material breach.
VI.

NYA DID NOT ELECT TO PURSUE ACTUAL DAMAGES BUT
ELECTED TO AND WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES
The district court incorrectly held that NYA had elected the remedy of actual

damages and therefore that NYA was not entitled to recover liquidated damages under
the REPC in an amount equal to the amount of the Earnest Money Deposit as that term
was defined in the REPC.
A.

NYA PLEAD ALTERNATIVELY FOR ACTUAL AND
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR HARRISONS' BREACH

The general rule of election of remedies is set forth in Angelos v. First Interstate
Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 778, (Utah 1983) where the Supreme Court stated that:
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of
fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose
to forego all others. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp.,
Utah, 603 P.2d 793, 796 (1979) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
The purpose of the election of remedies is to prevent a double redress for a single
wrong. However, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and modem pleading practice allow
a party to plead alternative theories and even to have such theories presented to the court
or Jury. Utah R. Civ. P 8(a) sets very minimal requirements for pleading an original
claim:
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(a) Claims for relief An original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or thirdparty claim shall contain a short and plain: ( 1) statement of the claim
showing that the party is entitled to relief; and (2) demand for judgment for
specified relief. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may
be demanded ....
Utah courts have adopted a very liberal approach to pleading. In MBNA Am. Bank, N.A.
v. Goodman, 2006 UT App 276, ,6, 140 P.3d 589 the court stated:
Under our liberal standard of notice pleading, a plaintiff is required "to
submit a 'short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief."' Canfield v. Layton
City, 2005 UT 60, Pl4, 122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting Utah
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). "The plaintiff must only give the defendant fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved.
In addressing the pleading of alternative remedies, the Court m Parrish v.
Tahtaras, 318 P .2d 642, 645 {Utah 1957) stated:
The alternate remedies, although formerly limited by a strict election
doctrine, may be pleaded in alternative form and may even be inserted by
amendment late in the proceedings. Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d
175,264 P.2d 279 {Utah 1953); U.R.C.P. 54(c)(l).
Consistent with Parrish Utah R. Civ. P 54{c)(l) provides that:
... every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings. [Emphasis added].
A party is to include a short plain statement that it is entitled to relief and make a
demand for judgment for the relief. It is entitled to judgment for the relief to which the
party is entitled even if it has not demanded that relief. NY A's amended complaint
satisfied these liberal pleading requirements. It sets forth three claims including, first,
rescission of the REPC, second, if the court found the REPC was a binding agreement
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that NYA was entitled to damages, and third, declaratory judgment. In the prayer of the
second claim upon which the court granted NYA summary judgment from Harrisons'
breach, Plaintiff prayed that NYA be granted "a judgment awarding New York the
damages that it incurred as a result of the Defendants' breach of the REPC." (R 33)
NYA's amended complaint did not state that it sought actual damages nor did it
state that it was not seeking liquidated damages.

Rather it merely included typical

general pleading language under Rule 8 seeking damages under the REPC for the
Harrisons' breach. NYA has been unable to locate any Utah cases which have held that a
party is required in its complaint to assert whether it seeks liquidated damages or actual
damages. NYA's amended complaint does not constitute an election under Angelos by
choosing the remedy of actual damages and evidencing that NYA was electing to forego
liquidated damages.
In its 2012 summary judgment motion (R290-3 l 9), NYA sought not only the
return of the earnest money deposits it had made, but liquidated damages in an amount
equal to the earnest money deposits. In its subsequent summary judgment motion for
damages, NYA again sought the return of its earnest money deposits and liquidated
damages in an amount equal to the earnest money deposits. (R728-752) Such motions
notified Harrisons of NYA's claim that Harrisons pay NYA its liquidated damages and
constituted demands therefore.
B.

NYA WAS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY HARRISONS OF ITS
ELECTION TO SEEK LIQUIDATED DAMAGES BY A WRITTEN
DEMAND OR NOTICE.
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The trial court nonetheless held that NYA was obligated to make a written notice
to and demand on Harrisons for liquidated damages and that by failing to do so NYA had
contractually elected to pursue actual damages.
REPC ,Il 6 provides as follows:
DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to
specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law.
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer
may elect to either accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money
Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this
contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer
upon demand.
Under ,II 6 there is a difference between the respective elections of buyer and
seller seeking liquidated damages.

Sellers elect liquidated damages by retaining the

earnest money deposit. In order for sellers to sue to enforce the contract or to pursue
other remedies at law, sellers are contractually obligated to first return the earnest money
deposit. Consistent with the language of the REPC, sellers who have not returned the
earnest money are not permitted to seek actual damages. See McKeon v. Crump, 2002
UT App 258, 53 P .3d 494. The same procedure does not apply to buyers. If sellers
default, buyers may elect to accept from sellers a sum equal to the earnest money deposit
as liquidated damages, may sue sellers to specifically enforce the contract or may pursue
other remedies available at law. There is no contractual provision as to how buyers are to
make such election, nor is there a prerequisite before a buyer may seek liquidated
damages, specifically enforce the contract or seek actual damages. However the REPC
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provides that, if a buyer does make the election to accept liquidated damages, the seller
is obligated to pay them upon demand.
There are no Utah cases defining how buyers under REPC's are to make the
election to accept liquidated damages nor imposing a notice or demand obligation as a
condition to making such election.
The trial court determined that NYA was required to make a demand in order to
elect liquidated damages, and that by virtue of the failure to make the demand that NYA
had elected liquidated damages. As support for its requirement the court cited a number
of cases involving different contractual provisions. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d
468 (Utah 1964) was an unlawful detainer action involving a forfeiture under a real
estate contract which the contract language required a written notice to the buyer of the
forfeiture and that buyer had become a tenant at will. Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard,
936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997) involved a forfeiture (which the "law abhors" and
under which the court stated the seller must comply strictly with the notice provisions) of
a uniform real estate contract. The contract required two separate notices to the buyer,
one was a notice of default, and the other was a notice informing buyer of his failure to
cure and of seller's election of the forfeiture remedy.

The contract language itself

required notice of the election remedy. See also Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah
App. 1987).

Such cases are inapplicable to the instant case because there is no similar notice
requirement for buyers under REPC 116. Nor is there a demand requirement under
REPC 116 to elect the remedy ofliquidated damages. The language of 116 merely states
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that the buyer may make an election to accept liquidated damages. Contrary to the trial
court's ruling there was no contractual requirement of a demand or notice in order to
elect liquidated damages under the REPC.
Since neither the REPC nor Utah cases have defined how to elect liquidated
damages, the above principles of Angelos apply. To make an election, the buyer would
have to do something to evidence that it had made a choice of remedy and foregone the
other available remedies. Moreover under Angelos, NYA's election of remedies should
only be applied to protect Harrisons from double recovery.

C.

NYA DID NOT ELECT TO PURSUE ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The trial court ruled that because of the stage to which NYA had litigated the
matter, it had contractually elected "to pursue other remedies available at law", namely
actual damages. NYA is unaware of any Utah case law in which litigation of breach of
contract claims that seek damages, without a designation of actual or liquidated,
constitutes an election to seek actual damages.

Such ruling is contrary to Angelos,

Parrish and the U.R.C.P. which allow the pleading of alternate claims and alternate
remedies and only preclude double recoveries. Because NYA did not do anything in its
litigation to indicate that it had made a choice to pursue actual damages and to forego
liquidated damages, NYA should not be deemed to have made such election. The only
evidence of a choice of remedy from the NYA's pleadings is NY A's initial summary
judgment motion and its summary judgment motion for damages which both sought
liquidated damages. Such pleadings are the only evidence of its choice of a remedy.
NYA did not by its actions elect actual damages. The court should reverse the trial
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court's holding and order that NYA had elected actual damages and return the matter to
the trial court to award NYA its liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money
deposits made.
VII.

NYA IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S
FEES
A.

~

NYA IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL A WARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES FOR RESEARCH.

In conjunction with its summary judgment motion for damages, NYA submitted

G,;

attorneys fees affidavits which complied with the requirements of Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 {Utah 1988); EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2008 UT App
284, 192 P.3d 296 {Utah App. 2008); and Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266
(Utah 1992), including descriptions of the work performed, the hours spent and the
hourly rate. Each of the attorneys fees affidavits asserted that the work was reasonable
and necessary. Harrisons objected because the affidavits did not identify the items or
subjects researched nor did they identify the legal issues discussed with NYA. NYA
asserted that disclosure of such detail was not required by the above cases and would be a
violation of the work product rule and attorney client privilege.

However, NYA's

counsel submitted an affidavit that generally described the initial research issues and
confinned that the research entries at the time of each memorandum were relative to the
issues in such memoranda. (R907-910) Notwithstanding, such affidavits, the trial court
declined to award NYA certain of its attorneys fees for research because the subjects of
the research were not disclosed. (R922).
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Although the above cited cases include the requirement that the attorneys affidavit
describe the work performed, no Utah cases require that the subjects researched be
disclosed in such affidavit nor do they require disclosure of the legal issues discussed
with the client. Subjects researched constitute attorney work product and should not be
required to be disclosed in order to be entitled to recover such attorneys fees. Nor should
the legal issues discussed with the client be subject to disclosure in order to recover for
such attorneys work since they are confidential. NYA should be awarded additional
attorneys fees with respect to the any time spent for research or legal issue discussions
that were not awarded by the trial court because the subjects of the research or the issues
discussed were not disclosed in the affidavits.
B.

IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT NYA IS ENTITLED TO
PURSUE ITS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAIMS, NYA IS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES FOR SUCH
CLAIMS.

Trial courts are entitled to detennine who is the prevailing party in litigation and
are to apply a variety of factors set forth in R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119,
1126-27, (Utah 2002). The trial court determined that NYA was the prevailing party and
that attorneys fees were to be awarded. However, the trial court determined that NYA
was not the prevailing party as to the part of its summary judgment motion for damages,
as to the liquidated damages. If the Court determines that NYA is entitled to liquidated
damages and to pursue such liquidated damages, then NYA would be the prevailing party
as to such liquidated damages claims. NY A would therefore be entitled to an award of its
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attorneys fees with respect to the liquidated damages claims that had not previously been
awarded.

C.

NYA IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL.

"Generally, 'when a party who received attorneys fees below prevails on appeal,
the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.' Brown v. Richards, 840
P.2d 143, 156 {Utah App. 1992)." Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 2010
UT App 9, ,16, 223 P.3d 1141 (Utah App. 2010). Since Harrisons appeal is not well
taken, NYA, as the prevailing party, should be entitled to its additional reasonable
attorneys fees incurred on this appeal.
The Court should remand the matter to the trial court for the award of additional
attorneys fees to NYA for attorneys fees for research that was not previously awarded,
for attorneys fees associated with its liquidated damages claims and for attorneys fee on
appeal.
VIII.

NYA IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
A.

NYA IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST FROM THE
DATE OF EACH PAYMENT OF EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT.

In the 2014 Order and Judgment, NYA was granted prejudgment interest on the
earnest money deposits it had made at the rate of 10% per annum as provided in UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 15-1-1{2) from the date of the Harrisons' August 31, 2009 breach. (R 921)

It is well established under Utah law that:

As to the allowance of interest before judgment, this court has heretofore
spoken, and the law in Utah is clear, viz: where the damage is complete
and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can
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be measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time
and not from the date of judgment.
Bjork v. April Indus., 560 P .2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) As a matter of public policy,
prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the
amount owed over time and, as a corollary, to deter parties from intentionally
withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing. See Trail Mt. Coal Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996); In Anderson, supra, the
trial court had awarded prejudgment interest on the earnest money, down payment and
taxes that had been paid from the date each of the payments were made. The court of
appeals, applying the principles of Bjork, affirmed such award of prejudgment interest
from the date of each payment because the damage was complete, the loss could be
measured and the amount of each loss was fixed as of a particular time, namely as of
the date of each payment. Id at ,I28. The same is true in the instant case. NYA should
be entitled to prejudgment interest as of the date of each of its payments of earnest
money.
In addition, if NYA is not awarded prejudgment interest from the date of each
payment, Harrisons would receive the benefit and use of NYA's money during the time
they had it without compensation to NYA. NYA would not be compensated for the
period from each payment to the date of the August 31, 2009 for the depreciating value
of the money owed. The deterrent effect on Harrisons would be reduced.
The court should award NYA interest at I 0% per annum on each earnest money
payment from the date of such payment and not just from the date of Harrisons' breach.

,...,;;J
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Such interest amounts have already been submitted to the court by affidavit. (R760762)

B.

NYA IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST FROM
AUGUST 31, 2009 ON THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AMOUNT.

If the Court determines that NYA is entitled to liquidated damages and to pursue
such liquidated damages, then NYA would also be entitled to prejudgment interest on the
liquidated damages amount at least from the date of the August 31, 2009. See Bjork,
Supra and see Trail Mt. Coal Co. Supra for the public policy reasons that prejudgment
interest should be awarded on the liquidated damages.

CONCLUSION
The court should deny Harrisons' appeal and should affirm the court's orders from
which Harrisons appealed. The court should reverse the court's order that NYA elected
actual damages and should remand the matter to the trial court to award NYA liquidated
damages to NYA, interest on the liquidated damages to NYA, to award NYA interest on
the earnest money payments from the dates thereof and to award attorney fees relative to
the liquidated damages to, for research work not awarded and for attorneys fees on

appeal.

Jt.

Respectfully submitted this£ day of J1ZJ,015. ,..
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EXHIBIT 1

-

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1
Statutes current through the acts of the 2015 General Session signed through March 20, 2015

•
•

Title 15 Contracts and Obligations in General

•

Chapter 1 Interest

Utah Code Annotated

15-1-1. Interest rates •

Contracted rate - Legal rate.

(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract.

•
~

(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest
for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.

•

(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or interest charge

that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before May
14, 1981.

•
History

L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C.
1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6; 1989, ch. 79, § 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1
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.ADDENDUfJI NO. 1

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
11

THIS IS AN ADDENDUM ta- that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the REPCj with an
Offer Reference Date of November 9. 2006 between New YOik Ave.. U..C.. as 8uyer.. and Hanis~ David &
Jan. as Se!fer. reganfmg the Property, 20.27 Acres off 950 W and approximately 700 S in Springville. UT Parcel #28:041:0031. Springvt~ utah 84663. The following terms are .hereby incorporated as part of tha
REPC:

1. Seiter disclosure deadline to be 14 days from date of fully executed contract.
2.

Due diligence deadrtne to be 90 days from date of fully exeouted contract to do any and all due_
dmg~ '\ha\ \he bu'yet deems necessaty ot ptudern: to de\errnine -\hat fue 'J)ropet\:t \s sa'\i~iac\ocy 1or. ·
Buyer's intended use. The due diligence approval shall be at the buyers sol& and absolute discretion.

3.

Settlement deadline to be 180 days frOm date of fully executed contract

4.

$31000, 000 purchase price· based on the assumption that the property contains 20.27 Acres, whioh · ·
equates to $148,002 per acre. If the exact acreage is more or Jess than 20.27 acres the purchase price •

\4)

is

wm increase or decrease accordingly based on $1481002 per acre.

VJ)

-~::-

-

5. Buyer wilt deposit the eamest money with First American Trtle Company located in Orem, Utah, within 5. ·
business days from the date of a fulJy executed contract.
_.,,,.___.,,_. •

vJ

6.

Buyer to pay Sellers closing costs not to exceed $10.000.

7.

Seller agrees to $ign within a reasonable time period alJ pertinent applications and documents requTred
for governmental approval of Buyefs proposed development

8.

Seifer agrees to give eccess to the Property during daylight hours for any testing. inspections,

surveying, and other similar $8MC8s for developing the Property, as the Buyer deems necessary. If
any type of large motorized equipment will be brought onto the property it will be coordinated through
the current lessee of the property as to minimize the lmpact on the current crop.

-.£)

9.

Buyer will be deemed to have approved the Property if the Buyer has not terminated this agreement by
the Due Diligence Deadline. The day following the Due omg·ence Deadline. the title company will
disperse the earnest money to tile Sefler. Thfs earnest money wm then be deemed earned and nonrefundable thereafter if Buyer fans to close for any reason. Released earnest money is the sole remedy
to tlle Seller if the Buyer falls to close for any reason.

1 0. The Buyer may chooSe. at his sore discretio~ to pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest ;;. .
money to continue the C()llfract monthly after the settlement deadfme. This additional moneyvvill be pai ·· ·

monthly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and wm be a credit towards the purchase price at closing.

11. If Buyer terminates this transaction for any reason, Buyer will turn over au surveys, engineering. soi
reports, phase I reports. etc. that may have been completed at no additT~~st to the Setler.
Seller shall have until 5:00 PM Mountain Time_ November 1 S. 20061 to accept the tenns of 1his ADOENQ\t
NO. 1 In acoordance With the provisions of Section 23 qf the REPC. Unless so accepted. .the offer as se{f.:.:,.=-·
forth in thisADDaJDUM NO. 1 shaff Japse.
:·.~ .
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EXHIBIT 4
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ATLANTA, GA
BALTIMORE. MD
BETHESDA.MD

DEHVER,CQ
LAS VEGAS, NV
LOS ANGELES, CA
PHILADELPHIA. PA

PHOENIX, AZ
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
VOORHEES,NJ
WAS~INGTON. DC
WILMINGTON.

DE

STEVEN J. NEWMAN
DIRECT DIAL: (801) 517-6878
PERSONAL FAX: (801) 596-6878
E--MAIL: NEWMANS@BALLARDSPAHR.COM

March 5, 2009
Via Federal Express and E-mail kkelly@rqn.com
Keith A. Kelly, Esq.
Ray Quinney & Nebeker

PO ·Box 45385
Salt ~e City, Utah 84111
Re:

Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") between David and Jan Harrison
("Seller''} and New York Ave., LLC ("Buyer'')

Dear Mr. Kelly:

·My firm has been retained· to represent the. Seller in connection with the matter
referenced above. Please advise the Buyer that the Seller: (i) is. not willing to terminate the
contract pursuant to the terms set-forth in your letter to Seller dated February 17, 2009; and (ii)
does not- agx:ee with your characterization of the facts concerning the REPC as set forth in your
letter.
· After reviewing the REPC, we· have determined that the Due Diligence Deadline
has expired and., while the Buyer has the right to extend the Settlement Date by making an
Extension Payment each month, the ~PC is silent as to an outside Settlement Date and is
therefore silent a~ to when Buyer's performance under the REPC must occur. It is unreasonable
tQ interpret the extension provision in the REPC as allowing the Buyer to extend the Settlenient .
indefinitely. It is well established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by which a
certain act must be performed, law implies that the act must be done within. a reasonable time
under the circumstances. See Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 at 1242.· It has been
over 16 months sirice the original Settlement Deadline, 1;3uyer has not closed on the purchase of
the property, and any reasonable time for closing has already p~sed..
We view Buyer's failure to close as a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.. Notwithstanding this breach, Seller is willing to close on or before August
5, 2009. Otheiwise, Seller reserves all of Seller's rights and remedies set forth in the REPC.
OMWEST #6792353 v2
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Keith A. Kelly, Esq.
March 5, 2009Page 2
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At your earliest convenience, please call me to discuss a reasonable Settlement
Deadline..

Very truly yours,

Steven J. Newman
SJN/sjn
cc:
David and Jan Harrison (via fax)
Chris Anderson
(via e-mail)
Steven Kelly
(via fed-ex)

v;.
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EXHIBIT 5

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

ATTORN(l'S J(r LAW
Clark P. Giles

August 31, 2009
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R. Gaty Wing<,

Re:

Real Estate Purchase Contract between
David and Jan Harrison, and New York Ave., LLC
Extension Payment for August of2009

801 342-2400 TEL
801 375-8379 FAX

Dear Mark, Jason & Steven:

Kelly J. Aj)pl<gate

Justin T. Toth
LlcsclB.Stt't'trts
Robert 0. Rice
Atth..-8.°"'l!er
Frederick R. Th1!e-r. Jr.
John W. Macuy
McKay M. Pursoo
Marl< W. Puaslcy
Matthew N, Ev,1ns.
Gory L Loll(IIT"OO{e
John P. Wun:::luU
S.muel C. Str>l&f\l
M.tthew R. Lewis

Paul C. 8urlce

As you are aware, I represent New York Ave, LLC, regarding the Real
Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), between your clients, David and
Jan Harrison ("the Harrisons" or "Sellers"), and New York Ave, LLC ("my
client" or "Buyer"). Originally, your clients the Harrisons signed the REPC on
November 10, 2006, and they signed addenda#1 and #2 on November 10, 2006
and November 22, 2006, respectively. The REPC involved the sale of your
clients' property located at approximately 950 W. and 700 S., Springville, UT,
also known as parcel #26-041-0031, on November 10, 2006. This REPC is the
subject of a lawsuit entitled New York Ave., LLC v. David D. & Jan. C.
Harrison, Case No. 090402295 (Utah 4 th D. Court) ("NY v. Harrison").
The REPC contains a clause with a due diligence period of90 days in
which my client had the ability to cancel the REPC at its discretion. The REPC
also contains a clause, paragraph 10 in Addendum No. 1, that allows my client
to extend the settlement deadline at monthly increments by paying an
"additional amount of non-refundable earnest money'' ("Extension
Payment(s)") that would "be a credit towards the purchase price at closing."
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Mark R. Gaylord

Jason D. Boren
Steven J. Newman
August 31, 2009
Page2

As you know, during the due diligence period, my client learned that the
city sewer was not available to service this property, thus making development
of this property not economically feasible at the time at the current purchase
price. It was possible that development would not be economically feasable for
a number of years at the cwrent purchase price. Therefore, prior to the end of
the 90 day due diligence perio~ ·the REPC was renegotiated as memorialized in
Addendum No. 2, dated November 22, 2006. At the time of the signing of ·
addendum #2, my client made your clients aware that the sewer was not
available to the property as originally anticipated. Therefore, the contract was
amended due to the fact that the property could not be developed as originally
anticipated.
Addendum No. 2, among other things, extended the settlement deadline
to October 31, 2007, included. 20.27 water shares in the sale, and reduced the
monthly Extension Payment from $12,500 to $6,250, based on the
understanding that it could take several years before this deal could be closed.
This amendment was also based upon my client's understanding that: ·
(a)

The purchase price for the property was based on the

asswnption that it could be developed as single family
residential that would maximize the development potential of
the land base<f on the zoning laws in place that govern the
subject property. With the lack of sewer capabilities, and
through further information garnered through the
development process that showed insufficient storm drainage
capacity, the property could not (at the time) be developed to
its maximum potential.
(b)

The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could
be developed to its maximum potential was crucial to my
clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a credit
towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the
REPC and was in no way to be considered "rent" or an
interest payment.

(c)

The closing deadline was being extended and Extension
Payment reduced in part to account for the fact that, since the
sewer was not readily available, it might be some time before
the property could be developed as anticipated.

(d)

The REPC could be extende~ at my client's discretion as
stated in the REPC, to allow for the property to be developed

L
!
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Mark R. Gaylord
JasonD. Boren
Steven J. Newman
August 31, 2009
Page3

to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to: sewer
line extension installed to the property, storm drainage
readily available, and property being economically feasible to
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville city and
existing market conditions.
My client has deposited $6,250 with First American Title Company on
.or before the last day of each and every month since the settlement deadline
noted in Addendum No. 2, thereby extending the settlement deadline every
month since that s~ttlement deadline. You have denied this point, apparently
claiming each such payment has not been made. This denial is found in
paragraph 19 of your Answer ("Answer') filed in NY v. Harrison.

:
:-

r
~

My client has performed and is continuing to perform under the parties'
REPC. Accordingly, my client hereby provides you with the $6,250 August
2009 Extension Payment We invite you to carefully discuss with your clients
what they understood was the purpose of Amendment No. 2 to the REPC. !!Y
negotiating this $6,250 check. you are agreeing with my client that it is entitled
under the REPC to make these payments in order to postpone closing in
accordance with the express terms of the REPC until it is economically feasible
to move forward with a residential development of the property as discussed
above, including in paragraphs {a) through (d). My client is simply seeking the
benefit of its bargain wider ·the REPC, and nothing more - in light of your
claims that my client may not now close under the REPC. Nothing in this letter
should b.e construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other
than those provided under the REPC.
I look forward to discussing this matter with you further in an attempt to
resolve your clients' concerns. Nothing herein constitutes a waiver or election
of any remedies or rights by my client
Sincerely,

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

~~'
·Keith A. Kell~ /

i1·
i

!~

.
Attorneys for Buyer New York Ave, LLC

1049491
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·VIA FACSIMILE AND HAND DELIVERY
Keith A Kelly, Esq;
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 S State Street #1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

.· Re:

i

!

i

j·

New York Ave, L.L.C. v. David and Jan Harrison .
Civil No. 090402295 ·

Dear Keith: ·
·w e are in receipt of your letter dated August 31,_2009, in the above-referenced matter.
· Like your previous ·correspondence, your letter attempts to insert conditions and other terins
which are not partofthe Real Estate Purchase Contract betweenNewYork Ave, LLC and David .
and Jan Harrison.
· ·
·
·
·

to

.
Contrary your assertions, the contract.was ~ot amended due to the alleged
unavailability of the sewer. "If your client was not satisfied with what it discovered during the
due diligence period, the Real Estate Purchase Contract provided for .specific procedures to
address such concerns. Your client failed to provide any written objections p_ursuant fo the Real
Estate Purchase Contract and·cannot now claim that it was dissatisfied with what it discovered in
the due diligence·period. ·
Despite your client's claims that it canriot develop the property as originally anticipated,
it has done nothing, to our kriowledge, to obtain sewer, ·or any other development rights or other
entitlements that may affect development of the property. Your client cannot sit idly by and wait
for someone else to accomplish what is solely within its ability and control. To do so constitutes
a breac~ of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. .
Moreover, your client's unexpressed intentions and "understanding" are simply irrelevant ·
to the express language of the ,Real Estate Purchase Contract. See Jaramillo v. .Farmers Ins. ·
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· Keith A. Kelly, Esq.
·september 2, 2009
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Group, 669·P.2d 1i31, 1233 (U~ 1983)("1t is.well established in the law that unexpressed
· intentions do not affect the. validity of a contract''}..
.

.

In short, your attempt to 1n:odify th~ terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and to .
make the negotiation of.the monthly check conditioned upon your client's unilateral and
unexpressed intentions and "understanding' is not only inappropriate, but constitutes a further
· breac~ of the parti~' Real Estate Purchase Contract S~ Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653 (Utah
App. 1997) (valid tender requires buyer to make bona fide unconditional offer of payment).
·Accordingly~ we enclos~ and return the check that you hand delivered to our offices. Please be
advised that we will continue to accept the monthly checks so long as you withdraw·your
-· inappropriate cc;>n~itions.
·
·
By reason of your inappropriate. and conditional tender

of these monies; my ci.ients.in~d

to· amend their counterclaim to·assert· a claim for your client's latest breach.

Please notify ine t,y
the end of the week whether yo~ will stipulate to allow the Harrisons to amend their
cowiterclaim~· In the event you refuse to do so, we will file·a motion to ·~end with the Court.
We look forward to your response.
Additionally, as you know, it has always been

our ~sition that the transaction should be

·closeci witlµnareasonable time. See Bra#/ord:v. Alvey & Sons, ~2-1 P.2d 1240 (Itis well
established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by w~ch a certain ·act must be
-perfonned, the law implies that the a« must be done within reasonable time). We have always
been willing to discuss and negoµate a--reasonabie closing date. You have rejected our· offers and
attempts.. W.e continue to be 'Yilling ~o discuss ~s matter.· Howe~eri we believe the b~ is.in.
your court. _Please let me know if you have any ·i~terest in discussing this matter further.
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· Enclosure
· cc:

Mark R. Gaylord, -Esq. ·
Steven J: Newman; Esq.
Michael D: Mayfield, Esq.
Mr. David Harrison ·
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EXHIBIT 7

l"'ILED ~

'JUN 1 4 2012

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Date: June 14, 2012
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,

Case No: 090402295
Judge David N. Mortensen

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The motion were
fully briefed and argued before the court on April 19, 2012. The court has been fully informed
and for reasons more fully set forth below denies defendant's motion and grants plaintiffs
motion in part.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment will be granted where "the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law," and "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
iI
~
iI

any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at (e).
-1-

Vi).

Additionally, the court "will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion." Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987).
loJ!P

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

NYA is a Utah limited liability company doing business in Utah County, Utah. Steven
Kelly is the registered agent and manager of NYA.

,.j)

2.

The Harrisons are the owners of over 20 acres of real property located at approximately
950 West 700 South in the Springville, Utah (the "Property").

3.

On or about November I 0, 2006, the parties entered into a real estate purchase contract
("REPC") whereby NYA agreed to purchase the Property for $3 million.

4.

Addendum #I, signed along with the REPC, provided that the Settlement Deadline
was 180 days from the date of the fully executed contract.

5.

Addendum # 1 provided as follows:
"The Buyer may choose, at his· sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of nonrefundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline.
This additional money will be paid monthly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and will be a
credit towards the purchase price at closing."

6.

On November 22, 2006, the parties entered into Addendum #2.

7.

Addendum #2 provided that the "settlement deadline is to be extended until after the
harvest season 2007 which will be October 31, 2007."

-2-
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8.

Addendum #2 reduced the Extension Payments to $6,250 per month and required the
Harrisons to include 20.27 water shares with the purchase.

9.

The parties have not agreed in writing to a limitation on the number of extensions of the
settlement deadline that NYA may secure by timely payment of the Extension Payment.

10.

The REPC and addenda provided that the initial earnest money deposit of $10,000 along
with the monthly Extension Payments all constitute non-refundable earnest money that
would have been applied to the purchase price at closing.

11.

The parties have not entered into any addenda to the REPC other than Addendum # 1 and
Addendum #2 nor any other written agreements modifying the REPC.

12.

REPC Addendum #2 states that the "date of the fully executed contract is to be the latest
signature date on this Addendum #2," which is November 22, 2006.

13.

Section 21 of the REPC states that "Time is of the Essence."

14.

Under the terms of the REPC, NYA had 90 days from the date of the fully executed
contract to conduct due diligence (the "Due Diligence Deadline").

15.

If, prior to the Due Diligence Deadline, NYA determined that the results of its due
diligence were unacceptable, it could choose to cancel the contract or to provide written
notice to the Harrisons of its objections.

16.

After the Due Diligence Deadline the earnest money was "deemed earned and nonrefundable thereafter if Buyer fails to close for any reason."

-3-

17.

On January 30, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons informing them of a
problem connecting the Property to the Springville sewer system. He further stated:

\/9

"It looks like I won't be able to develop the property until mid-2008 at the earliest.
However, I like the property and want to continue the contract as it is currently
written ... On October 31st I will start making the monthly payments to you that we agreed
upon until I close the property, which will be when the sewer trunk line is installed and I
can get the necessary approvals from the city to develop."

18.

On September 19, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons updating them on his
progress in developing the Property. Specifically, he informed them that he had found a
way to work around the problem with connecting to the Springville sewer system. He
further stated, "I will be paying the extension fees as outlined in the purchase contract
until I close. It shouldn't be too far into the future."

19.

In October 2007, NYA began making the monthly Extension Payments in accordance
with the terms of the REPC and its addenda.

20.

In early 2008, Mr. Kelly attempted to get approval from Springville City to work around
the sewer trunk line issue.

21.

In April 2008, Mr. Kelly disclosed to his site engineer Brian Gabler that "[W]e are
holding off pursuing this at the current time."

22.

In July 2008, Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Kelly that he did not want to wait any longer for
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NYA to close.
23.

In December 2008, Mr. Harrison began discussing with Mr. Kelly his options for
terminating the contract. The parties did not come to an agreement.

24.

On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons through their attorney, Steve Newman, sent a letter to
NYA stating that it had been 16 months since the original Settlement Deadline and that
any reasonable time for closing had passed.

25.

The March 5, 2009 letter asserted that NYA was in breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but that the Harrisons were willing to close on or before
August 5, 2009.

26.

The March 5, 2009 letter asserted that if not closed by August 5, 2009, the Harrisons
reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC.

27.

On April 22, 2009, NYA's counsel sent a letter that stated, "My clients have the right to
continue making the Extension Payments under the Contract, without an arbitrary and
artificial August 5, 2009 deadline."

28.

NYA did not agree in writing, or otherwise, to the August 5, 2009 closing date.

29.

On May 14, 2009, after a failed settlement negotiation, the Harrisons informed NYA that

,-..c)

it expected it to continue to perform its obligations under the REPC.
30.

On August 31, 2009, NYA's counsel sent Harrison's counsel the Extension Payment
along with a letter that contained that following:
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(a) The purchase price for the property was based on the assumption that it could be
developed as single family residential that would maximize the development potential of
the land based on the zoning laws in place that govern the subject property. With the lack
of sewer capabilities, and through further information garnered through the development
process that showed insufficient storm drainage capacity, the property could not (at the
time) be developed to its maximum potential.

(b) The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could be developed to its
maximum potential was crucial to my clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a
credit towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the REPC and was in no
way to be considered "rent" or an interest payment.

(c) The closing deadline was being extended and the Extension Payment reduced in part
to account for the fact that, since the sewer was not readily available, it might be some
time before the property could be developed as anticipated.

(d) The REPC could be extended, at [NYA's] discretion as stated in the REPC, to allow
for the property to be developed to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to:
sewer line extension installed to the property, storm drainage readily available, and
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property being economically feasible to develop under zoning ordinance of Springville
City and existing market conditions.
31.

The August 2009 letter accompanying the Extension Payment stated, "Nothing in this
letter should be construed as a demand by [Plaintiff] for any rights or benefits other than
those provided under the REPC."

32.

The Harrisons refused to accept the August 2009 Extension Payment as presented and in
a letter from their counsel to NYA's counsel stated, "[Y]our attempt to modify the terms
of the [REPC] and to make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon your
client's unilateral and unexpressed intentions and 'understanding' is not only
inappropriate, but constitutes a further breach of the parties' [REPC. ]"

33.

The Harrisons informed NYA that they would "continue to accept the monthly checks so
long as [NYA] withdraw [its] inappropriate conditions."

vi>

34.

NYA has not closed on the Property and has not made or attempted to make any
extension payments since August 2009 .

.ANALYSIS

1.

Time of Performance

The Harrisons argue that NYA breached by failing to perform within a reasonable time.
v4'

"[I]f a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within
a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter & Smith Ltd v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858
(Utah 1998) (citing Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986)). "When the parties to a

VI)
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bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court." Restatement (Second) ofContracts § 204. A court "may
allow a contract to be performed within a reasonable time only when the contract is silent as to
the time for its performance." Watson v. Hatch. 728 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1986).
The parties explicitly agreed in the REPC and the addenda that the settlement deadline
would be October 31, 2007. They also agreed that NYA "may choose, at its sole discretion, to
pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after
the settlement deadline." Therefore, each monthly extension payment extended the settlement
deadline to the end of the following month.
The Harrisons use the Tenth Circuit case Navair, Inc. v. /FR Americas, Inc. (utilizing
Kansas law) to assert that the reasonable time requirement still applies even if the contract
contains a specific date for performance that has been extended. 519F.3d1131, 1138 (10th Cir.
2008). The Navair case is distinguishable from the present case. Navair involved a contractual
dispute regarding the length of time an oral extension of the contract was valid for. The present
case involves a contract which clearly states that extensions will be allowed and each extension
will continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline. Unlike Navair, there is no
...tJ)

ambiguity regarding the extension of the contract deadline so long as a valid tender of extension
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payment was made. Because the contract specified a time for performance, the court cannot
impose a reasonable time.
The Harrisons contend that allowing NYA to continue making the extension payments
indefinitely would lead to absurd results in that it would allow NYA to make interest-free
payments for 40 years until the extension payments amounted to the purchase price. The
Harrisons meanwhile would be forced to continue paying the carrying costs including property
taxes. The Harrisons further argue that this could not have been the original intention of the
parties because the parties did not execute the standard Seller Financing Addendum nor indicate
anywhere in the REPC that they intended to create a seller-financed transaction.
The Utah Supreme Court held in, Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larken-Gif.ford-Overton, LLC, that
"[w]here the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties'
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract

..J

may be interpreted as a matter of law." 207 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2009). "Only if the language
of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent." Id

vu

The evidence before the court shows that the parties agreed to the extension payment
clause of the contract. Addendum # 1 of the REPC specifically states that NYA "may choose, at
his sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the

..J

contract monthly after the settlement deadline." It does not limit the number of times that the
extension payments may be made, only that it is in NYA's sole discretion. The wording is clear
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and unambiguous; therefore, NYA was entitled to extend the settlement deadline so long as valid
tender of the extension payment was made.
NYA's statements in letters sent to the Harrisons regarding the time frame for settling
constitute extrinsic evidence and cannot be considered by the court in determining if the contract
contained a specific time for performance.
2.

Anticipatory Breach

NYA claims that the Harrisons anticipatorily breached the contract by asserting that NYA
was in default and demanding closing occur on August 5, 2009. As evidence of anticipatory
breach, NYA points to comments made by Mr. Harrison to the effect that he wanted his $3
million and that he was not willing to wait around anymore. On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons'
attorney sent a letter to NYA stating that it had been 16 months since the original settlement
deadline and that any reasonable time for closing had passed. NYA claims that this letter implied

va

that NYA was in breach of its performance under the REPC. The letter also stated that the
Harrisons were willing to close on or before August 5, 2009, and that if NYA did not close by
that date then the Harrisons reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC. In addition,
NYA points to the Harrisons' answers to the amended complaint in this action. Lastly, NYA
points to the Harrisons' refusal to accept the August 31, 2009 Extension Payment as evidence of

viJ

anticipatory breach.

-10-

"An anticipatory breach of contract is one committed before the time has come when
there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts evincing an intention
to refuse performance in the future." Upland Industries Corp. v. P. Gamble Robinson Co., 684
P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984). An anticipatory breach occurs only if a party to a contract "manifests
a positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised performance." Cobabe v. Stanger,
844 P.2d 298,303 (Utah 1992).
The Harrisons did not anticipatorily breach the contract. Although the Harrisons
demanded that NYA close on or before August 5, 2009 and Mr. Harrison expressed his desire to
either close or have NYA stop payments, these facts, especially viewed in a light most favorable
to the Harri sons, do not "manifest a positive and unequivocal intent not to render [their]
promised performance." Id The Harrisons' statements, the letter and the pleadings are better
described as negotiation and litigation techniques, not a manifestation of their intention to refuse
future perfonnance.

3.

The August 31, 2009 Extension Payment Constituted Valid Tender

The letter accompanying the August 2009 Extension Payment lists the reasons why NYA
originally intended to purchase the Property, namely, to develop for single-family residential
homes; and the reasons why NYA has faced delays in readying the Property for development,
namely, the sewer capabilities and storm drainage. Section (d) of the letter states:
"The REPC could be extended, at my client's discretion as stated in the
REPC, to allow for the property to be developed to its full potential. This
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includes, but is not limited to: sewer line extension installed to the property,
storm drainage readily available, and property being economically feasible to
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville City and existing market
conditions."
The Harrisons claim that NYA breached the express terms of the REPC by making the
August 2009 Extension Payment contingent on the Harrisons' acceptance of additional terms and
failing to make any subsequent Extension Payments.

"In order to be valid, tender of payment of money due must be ... unconditional." PDQ

Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber 949 P.2d 792,800 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "A tender, to be good, must be
free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts v.
White, 2 Utah 2d 351,273 P.2d 974 (Utah 1954). "The tender cannot impose on the other party a

new condition or requirement not already imposed by the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial

Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992).
The August 2009 Extension Payment only contained conditions that NYA already had a
right to insist upon based on the REPC, and therefore the extension payment was unconditional.
The REPC does not explicitly state that closing would take place when it is economically feasible
~

to develop, or based on the sewer line availability, storm drainage issues, or when the property
could be developed to its maximum potential. The contract does, however, allow for extensions
according to the Buyer's sole discretion. NYA's letter to the Harrisons noting its reasons for
making the Extension Payments was a display of its discretion. The reasons for extending the
closing are irrelevant inasmuch as those reasons flesh out NYA's discretion. The letter did not
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add additional terms to the contract because according to the contract, NYA has the right to
extend at its discretion. NYA's letter required the Harrisons to acknowledge rights that the

"'

contract had already granted to NYA; therefore, the August 2009 Extension Payment cannot be
viewed as an invalid tender of payment. The Harrisons therefore breached the contract by
refusing the valid tender.
When the Harrisons refused the August extension payment they told NYA that they
would accept the extension payments so long as they were not accompanied by additional
conditions. They claim that because NYA failed to tender any other payments that NYA was in
breach of the REPC. "[U]nder the 'first breach' rule 'a party first guilty of a substantial or
material breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He
can neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other party
for a subsequent failure to perform."' CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 116 P.3d 366,373 (Utah 2005)

(quoting Jackson v. Rich, 28 Utah 2d 134,499 P.2d 279,280 (1972)).
Because the Harrisons refused the valid tender of the August 2009 Extension Payment,
NYA's refusal to make any further extension payments is not a "failure to perform." The
Harrisons were the first party to breach the contract and "cannot complain if the other party
(NYA) thereafter refuses to perform." Id
A final note as to the August tender: the court did not give credence to the language in the
letter accompanying the August tender which stated "Nothing in this letter should be construed
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as a demand by [NYA] for any rights or benefits other than those provided under the REPC."
Although the court agrees with this statement, the court was not influenced by it. If the letter had
in fact required the Harrisons to agree to additional terms, the statement would have carried no
weight so the court analyzed the letter without regard to that statement. .
.,.;;

4.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The Utah Supreme Court, in U.S. Fidelity v. US. Sports Specialty, defines the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as "a duty not to intentionally or purposely do anything [that] will
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract and to ... act
consistently with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party."
US. Fid v. U.S. Sports Specialty, 270 P.3d 464,470 (Utah 2012).

Utah looks to the justified expectations of the parties to determine breach of good faith
and fair dealing. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,200 (Utah 1991).
This requires the court to look beyond the terms of the contract because an examination of
contract terms alone is insufficient to determine the justified expectations of the parties. Id
However, "[n]o such covenant may be invoked ... if it would create obligations inconsistent with
express contractual terms." Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 266 P.3d 814, ~ 10 (Utah
2011 ). "While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, ... this
covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to which the parties did
not agree ex ante." Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, ~ 45 (Utah 2004).
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NYA has presented facts that it intended to extend the contract until it could develop the
property and the Harrisons have brought forth facts that show they wanted a speedy closing. Thus
there is a fact issue as to the parties' justified expectations. In addition, the Harrison's claim as to
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is denied because the contract granted NYA
..&>

the right to the extensions according to NYA's sole discretion and to find them in breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be inconsistent with the express terms of the
contract and would be the enforcement of duties to which the parties did not initially agree to.
5.

Additional Earnest Money Deposits Apply to the Purchase Price

NYA seeks a summary declaratory judgment that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits
apply to the purchase price. Addendum #2 changed the amount of the monthly extension
payment from $12,500 to $6,250; nothing in Addendum #2 changed the provision that the
Additional Earnest Money Deposits were to be applied to the purchase price at closing. The
Harrisons do not dispute this claim and state that they have never disputed this claim during the
course of this litigation. NYA is therefore entitled to declaratory judgment that the Additional
Earnest Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price.
6.

No Limitation on the Number of Extension Payments

The REPC does not expressly limit the number of extension payments that the Buyer is
entitled to so long as the $6,250 extension payment is timely made. "A contract should be
reformed only when its terms are so vague that the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained
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therefrom." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1973). Placing a limit
on the number of extension payments allowed would be reforming the contract and thereby
rewriting the parties' agreement. The contract in this case is clear, and NYA is entitled to
declaratory judgment that the REPC does not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is
vi

entitled when it timely pays the Extension Payments.

7.

Motion to Strike

Defendants moved to strike portions of the Steven Kelly affidavit. While the motion was
well-taken, the issue is ultimately moot because the court did not rely on paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10 or
13 of the affidavit in ruling on this matter.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Utah in Carlson v. Hamilton said, "People should be entitled to
contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of
one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into
contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on one side." 332
P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958); See also Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084, 1089 (Utah 1988)
(holding that courts should intervene and alter the contractual provisions only when the
enforcement of the terms of the uniform real estate contract would be unconscionable). Though
the Harrisons argue that allowing for indefinite extension payments would lead to absurd results,
the courts may not step in to alleviate the effects of a bad bargain.
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The contract in this case provides for a specific time of performance; therefore, this court
cannot imply a reasonable time of performance. While the Harrisons' actions prior to August of
2009 did not manifest anticipatory repudiation of the contract, the Harrisons refusal to accept the
August 2009 Extension Payment was an actual breach of the contract. Since the Harrisons
.;;;

breached the contract first by refusing a valid tender, they cannot then claim a breach by NYA in
failing to perform. Because the Harrisons breached, NYA is entitled to its contractual remedies.
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted as to all claims except for the claim
that the defendants breached the agreement anticipatorily, and Defendants' motion for summary
judgment is denied. Additionally, Plaintiff's motion for partial declaratory summary judgment is
granted in that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits apply to the purchase price and
Defendants may not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely
pays the Additional Earnest Money Deposits. Plaintiffs counsel will draft an order consistent
with this ruling.
Dated this 14th day of June 2012.

BY THE COURT:

-Judge David N. Mortensen
Fourth Judicial District Court

-17-

0385

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 090402295 by the method and on the date
specified.
·~

MAIL:
84111
MAIL:

JASON D BOREN 201 S MAIN ST STE 800 SALT
DAVID D JEFFS 90 N 100 E POB 888 PROVO
06/14/2012

LAKE CITY, UT

UT 84603-0888

/s/ GEORGIA R SNYDER

Date:
vi)

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)

- ---·

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
DAVID D. JEFFS, #1654
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Phones (801) 373-8848
Facsimile (801) 373-8878
E-mail: ddjeffs@ieffslawoffice.com

\1-\?z'.\\l Z k'4Y

. ,! ~.: . .

:

1Jt39ufy

-(

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
.

;

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UT~H

NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant,
Case No. 090402295
vs.
Judge: David N. Mortensen
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on April 19, 2012 on Plaintifrs
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties
were represented by counsel. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits
and other evidence present and on file, having heard the parties arguments, and otherwise being

051.0

fully advised in the premises, issued its Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Based
on the Court's Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court now enters the
following:

ORDER
1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Plaintifrs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to NY A's Second Claim for

Relief for Breach of REPC is granted, except for the claim of that Defendants anticipatorily
breached the REPC, and Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies.
3.

Plaintifrs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintifrs Third Claim for

Relief for Declaratory Judgment is granted and iti is hereby ordered that the Additional Earnest
Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price under the REPC and that the REPC does not
limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely pays the Extension
Payments ..
4.

Because the Harrisons breached, Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies.

However, the previous ruling of the court did not determine the amount of Plaintifr s damages.
The issue o·f the amount of Plaintiffs damages, costs and attorneys fees is reserved at this time
to be the subject of further motions or trial.
_,,

Dated and signed this S1t'fiy of

w
2

0509

@

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
@

@

Mark Gaylord
Jason D. Boren
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
---------------..................,......._...._______________________________________,..~--.....-----------......------NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,

RULING ON MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Date: July 5, 20 ~
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,

:>

Case No: 090402295
Judge David N. Mortensen

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to reconsider this Court's earlier
determination regarding cross-motions for summary judgment. This court received oral
vJ

arguments from the parties. At that hearing, New York A venue, LLC ("NYA") also made a
motion for determination of damages, which motion was withdrawn. For the reasons which
follow, this court denies the motion. 1
Initially, the court should indicate that in its view the motion to reconsider should only
consider new facts when a party claims that new evidence has arisen since the time of the court's
I

prior ruling. That is not the case here. Instead, the defendant's motion is quite clear that

I

1

The Court acknowledges that it has taken some time for the court to issue this ruling. ·
However, given the parties great pains they have taken to provide the court with large body o(
case law, the Court has taken the opportunity to read all of those cases individually, engage in
independent research, and undergo a contemplative review of this matter.

1
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defendants assert that the court made mistakes of law or mistakes of applying facts to law ~ch
the court should reconsider. Particularly, defendants maintain that the court misconstrued the
i

covenant of good faith and fair dealing and misapplied the tender statute. For these reasons, the
Court is not considering any of the factual statements offered by any party in relation to this I
motion. Instead, the court has reviewed this motion to reconsider only on its legal basis under
the factual predicate of the motion already heard.
Defendants make a number of assertions or pleadings which are inaccurate. Defendants
maintain that the court ruled that the REPC term giving NYA discretion to extend the
v)

perfonnance date for the contract "precludes the application of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing." This was not the ruling of the court. Instead, the ruling of the court was that upder
the particular circumstances of this case and the facts as presented to the court, defendants could
not assert that plaintiff's reliance on an express term of the contract violated the covenant of i
good faith and fair dealing. There would remain innumerable ways in which the parties could

vJJ

have violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the REPC's giving NYA discretion
to extend the performance period might have nothing to do with such potential breaches of the
covenant.
Strangely, defendants fail to recognize that their argument is that unilaterally announjing
that the performance period could not be extended, in direct contravention of the express

~

1

contractual terms, would be not in keeping with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. pie

-2-

I

I

court's determination here, in keeping with Utah precedent, is that the covenant of good faith and
I

fair dealing did not apply because plaintiff was exercising an express condition of the contract.
In the present case, the court in no wise ruled that NYA had unfettered discretion in

1
I

vP ·

extending the contract. The court only ruled that it was not a violation of the covenant good faith
I

and fair dealing to extend the contract in compliance with the express terms which provided, I
first, a time certain for the extension, and secondly, a component of additional consideration for
!

the exercise of that discretion. This express provision of the contract is considered against th~
I

background that the parties could have limited the number of times the contract could have b~en
vJ

extended or they could have provided for a back-end, or "drop dead," date by which NYA wduld
have to perform. The parties chose not to include such a provision.
As plaintiff correctly points out, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited: 1
First, this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties
to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Second, this covenant cannot creat~
rights and duties inconsistent with the express contractual times. Third, this
covenant cannot compel a contractual party to exercise a contractual right "to its
own detriment for the purpose of benefitting another party to the contract." 1
Finally, we will not use this covenant to achieve an outcome in harmony with the
court's sense ofjustice but inconsistent with the express terms of the applicable
contract.

I
Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,r 45, 104 P.3d 1226 (quoting
I
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 447 n. 13 (Uta:h
vJ

App. 1994).
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In the present case, the assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants would
~

establish new and independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree in the form~tion
I

of the contract The assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants would create rights
1./fj

and duties inconsistent with the express contractual terms. Using the covenant to overcome the
I
express terms of the contract would elevate the court's sense of justice above those express
terms. This court declines to do so.
Ultimately, this court concludes there is no violation of the covenant good faith and fair
dealing here because "There is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter oflaw, whep a

vJ

party is simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utph
App. 1997)(emphasis added). Here, the court concludes that NYA was simply exercising its ,
contractual rights and therefore the court concluded, as a matter of law, that no violation of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing had occurred. This court concludes that reasonable minds I
could not differ in concluding that NYA did not wrongfully exercised the express contractual 1

va

provisions here.
The court has reviewed its decision regarding the tender in this case and does not believe

~

that one party explaining to the other why it is taking certain actions in extending the contrac~
I
again pursuant to the express terms of the contract, violates the tender statute. Under the
I
defendant's analysis had NYA simply sent a one line letter purporting to extend the contract with
!
a check, everything would have been fine. However, explaining their thinking as to why they.
I
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I

were electing to extend made the offer somehow conditional in the defendants' minds. The ~urt
again disagrees. Instead, this court considered the context of the parties actions and specifically
looked at whether the tender added new additional terms. This court concluded that the tender

!
..d)

did not and therefore the tender was valid.
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied. Plaintiff's counsel shall subm\t on
order for the court's signature.
Dated this 5th day of July 2013-

Judge David ~:-/ilJ'.'mr.linr4

Fourth Judicial
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Case No. 090402295

DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,

Judge: David N. Mortensen

Defendants and
Counterclaimants.

This matter came before the court on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider its ruling on the
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The court
having reviewed the motions and memoranda filed by the parties, having heard the oral
arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises and having entered its ruling now
..dJ

makes and enters the following:

ORDER
1.

Defendants maintain that the court ruled that the REPC term giving NYA

discretion to extend the performance date for the contract "precludes the application of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." This was not the previous ruling of the court. Instead,
the previous ruling of the court was that under the particular circumstances of this case and the
facts as presented to the court, defendants could not assert that plaintiff's reliance on an express
term of the contract violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court's
determination here, in keeping with Utah precedent, is that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing did not apply because plaintiff was exercising an express condition of the contract.

2.

In the present case, the court in no wise ruled that NYA had unfettered discretion

in extending the contract. The court only ruled that it was not a violation of the covenant good
faith and fair dealing to extend the contract in compliance with the express terms which
provided, first, a time certain for the extension, and secondly, a component of additional
consideration for the exercise of that discretion. This express provision of the contract is
considered against the background that the parties could have limited the number of times the
contract could have been extended or they could have provided for a back-end, or "drop dead,"
date by which NYA would have to perform. The parties chose not to include such a provision.
3.

In the present case, the assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants

would establish new and independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree in the
formation of the contract. The assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants would
create rights and duties inconsistent with the express contractual terms. Using the covenant to

3

overcome the express terms of the contract would elevate the court's sense of justice above those
express terms. This court declines to do so.
4.

The court concludes there is no violation of the covenant good faith and fair

dealing here because "There is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter oflaw, when a
party is simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube v. Huber, 949 P .2d 792, 798 (Ut
App. 1997) (emphasis added). The court concludes that NYA was simply exercising its
contractual rights. Therefore the court concluded, as a matter of law, that no violation of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing had occurred. The court further concludes that reasonable
minds could not differ in concluding that NYA did not wrongfully exercise the express
contractual provisions.
5.

The court has reviewed its decision regarding the tender in this case and does not

believe that one party explaining to the other why it is taking certain actions in extending the
contract pursuant to the express terms of the contract, violates the tender statute. Under the
defendants' analysis had NYA simply sent a one line letter purporting to extend the contract with
a check, everything would have been fine. However, Plaintiffs explaining their thinking as to
why they were electing to extend made the offer somehow conditional in the defendants' minds.
The court again disagrees.
6.

The court considered the context of the parties actions and specifically looked at

whether the Plaintiffs tender added new additional terms. The court concluded that the tender
did not add new additional terms, and therefore the tender was valid.
7.

Based on all of the foregoing, the Defendants' motion for reconsideration is
4

n n~22

@

@

denied.
@

Dated this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ ___, 2013

BYTHECOURT

Judge David N. Mortensen
Fourth Judicial District Court

@

@
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICl' COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-·· ..

NEW YORK AVE, LLC,

Ruling on Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Damages

Plaintiff,

v.

Date: May 30, 2014

DAVID HARRISON and JAN
HARRISON,

Case No. 090402295
Judge David N. Mortensen

Defendants.

Plaintiff has brought a motion for partial summary judgment on damages. Earlier, this
court granted partial summary judgment as to liability. The present motion came before the court
for oral argument on May 15, 2014. After interrogating1 counsel, the court indicated that it felt it
could rule as a matter of law as to the issue of the "election of remedies" provision of the real
estate purchase contract at issue. However, the court indicated that if plaintiffs were seeking
anything other than damages based upon what monies had been paid to defendants as earnest

1

vJ9

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides that a court may "interrogate" counsel to
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and thereupon make a
determination of which facts will be adjudicated trial.
1

0870

money or otherwise, then factual issues precluded entry of summary judgment.2 Plaintiff's
counsel requested, and was granted, leave to discuss with his clients whether to accept the
amounts discussed by the court, or whether to proceed with trial. Tentative trial dates were set.

In a follow-up telephone conference ofMay 20, 2014, plaintiff indicated that it did not
wish to proceed to trial, that plaintiff would only seek those damages previously addressed in
court, and that plaintiff would prepare a judgment after receipt of a memorandum of this Court's
ruling outlining the court's views on the election of remedies issue and a determination of
reasonable attorneys fees. Defendants agreed with striking the trial and moving forward as
..;;;

indicated with the entry of the judgment.3 The parties agreed that upon receipt of this court's
ruling, plaintiff's counsel will prepare and submit a judgment and order reflecting the court's
rulings, with leave to review the figure discussed in court for prejudgment interest, and submit
those documents to the court. The court indicated that if a dispute arose as to the amount of
prejudgment interest, plaintiff could insert their figure in their proposed judgment, defendants

l.l!P

could objects thereto, plaintiff could respond to the objection, and the court would resolve the
issue based upon those memoranda. Accordingly, the court explains the legal position regarding
a election of remedies and rules as to attorneys fees as follows.
2

Specifically, this court indicated that it viewed the case as defendants did and that the
only damages thus far proved on the record before the court were $147,503 in return of money
deposited with the defendants, $79,089.30 in prejudgment interest, and reasonable attorneys fees.
3

Defendants expressly reserved their objection to, and their intent to appeal, any issues
relating to liability.
2

Election of Remedies
Plaintiff claims to be seeking damages under paragraph 18 of the real estate purchase
contract in this case. That paragraph states in pertinent part:
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit,
Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically
enforce this contract or pursue other remedies available of law. If Buyer
elects to except liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated
damages to Buyer upon demand.
(emphasis added). The facts are undisputed before this court, and plaintiW s counsel
acknowledged at oral argument, that plaintiff has never fonnally elected which of the contractual
remedies under paragraph 18 it is seeking. Specifically, plaintiff acknowledges that it has never,
including up to the time of oral argument on the motion for partial summary judgment, made any

-.a

demand pursuant to paragraph 18 of the real estate purchase contract.
This court ruled that by virtue of litigating the matter up to the threshold of trial that
plaintiffs had elected their remedy contractually. This court found from the circumstances that
the buyer had elected to "pursue other remedies available at law," specifically actual damages.4
Plaintiff argues however that "election of remedies" is simply a procedural device to ensure that
a party does not recover twice for the same damages.
Plaintiff's position exhibits a fundamental misunderstanding between the procedural
doctrine of election of remedies and a contractual provision for the election of remedies. Myriad
4

Plaintiff has never claimed it was seeking specific performance.
3

0868

cases show this distinction. Plaintiff cites the Utah Supreme Court case of Angelos v. First

Interstate Bank Of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983) which does explain the procedural doctrine.

·viP

~

The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of
fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose
to forego all others.

Id. at 778 (quoting Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah
1979)). The application of the doctrine of election of remedies makes sense in the context of the

Angelos case, where an orthodontist brought a claim against a bank for wrongful acceptance of
checks with forged endorsements of the orthodontist's assistant. In Angelos the question was
whether the orthodontist could obtain a judgment against both the bank and the assistant. Under
~

the law, the Angelos court held that the orthodontist could proceed against both parties.
Likewise, the doctrine of election of remedies would not allow a party in a contract action, for
example, to recover both breach of contract and quasi-contract damages, since the theories are
mutually exclusive. Still, modem pleading practice would allow alternative theories to be pied
and even presented to the jury for a factual determination of which one applied. See Parrish v.

~

Tahtaras, 1 Utah 2d 87,318 P.2d 642 (1957). In this way, a party will not be required to make
an election of remedies as a procedural matter.
A contractual provision for the election of remedies, on the other hand, is an entirely
different matter. As far back as Varn Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367m 393 P.2d 468,470
4

(1964) the Utah Supreme Court held that a contractual provision giving a party several
,.J

alternative remedies "requires [the party] to make his election; and the [other party] is entitled to
notice that he has done so." In Adair v. Bracken, 145 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), a case with
vd>

some similarities to the present case, the court held that a seller did not provide the buyer with
adequate notice of default and notice of forfeiture as required by the contract, and this failure had
a substantive effect. In the contractual context, action by a party can constitute a contractual

:.d}

election of remedies. This was the actual holding in McKeon v. Crump, 2002 UT App 258, 53
P .3d 494; that is, an act - failure to return the earnest money before filing suit - constituted a
...;;

contractual election of remedies precluding other remedies under the contract. See accord

Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, 68 P.3d IO 15 (renovators
contractually elected remedy under purchase agreement and were precluded from maintaining an
..a)

action for breach of the same agreement): Commercial Invest. Corp., v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105,
1109 n.7 (Utah App. 1997)(noting that a default notice did not give notice of an election of
...a

remedies, "a requirement of the contract terms.").
Because this case involves a contractual provision for the election of remedies, and not
the procedural doctrine of election of remedies, and because plaintiff admits it has not ever

~

(including up to the present time) made a demand required by the contract in this case, by
pursuing this lawsuit plaintiff has elected contractually the remedy of seeking actual damages and
vJ

not the "Earnest Money Deposit", however that term is interpreted, under paragraph 18 of the

5

contract.

Attorney Fees. The Court has previously concluded that plaintiff is the prevailing party
in this matter and has indicated that attorney's fees should be awarded. Plaintiff has presented
vj

their attorneys fees up to the time of the motion as part of this motion for summary judgment.
Defendant maintains that the amount of fees sought is unreasonable and that plaintiff is not
entitled to certain attorneys fees or costs under the law.

'JI!)

The court has carefully considered the arguments of the parties in connection with
attorneys fees and most particularly the multiple affidavits filed by plaintiff's current and former
·~

counsel. Upon review, as the court indicated at the hearing of this matter, the Court will not
allow any of the costs claimed except for the filing fee of $360. The other costs are the normal
expenses of litigation which should be subsumed in general attorneys fees, or they are otherwise

..ii

not costs which have typically been allowed by Utah courts, and there has been no showing here
of extraordinary circumstances as to why they should be allowed in this case.
Defendants have objected to the attorney's fees as being unreasonable and in one
particular way this court agrees. Some entries on the billing statements indicate simply
"research" with no indication as to the issues being researched. Under such circumstances, this
vi}

court is unable to determine whether the issue would require the hours of research is indicated.
Plaintiff has indicated that disclosing such information would violate the work product privilege .
...;

To this point, the court would note that the case is essentially over and there seems little reason,

6
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if any, to withhold the information. More fundamentally, plaintiff's counsel is entitled to
essentially keep secret the topics of this research. But at the same time, plaintiff cannot seek
reimbursement for them when their subject matter is kept secret. The court has deducted from
~

the attorney's fees all such entries. Finally, the court has considered the fact that a majority of
fees incurred in the fall of 2013 are related to the present motion for partial summary judgment
regarding damages. In the court's view, a significant part of the ultimate theory of the plaintiff
did not prevail in this motion. And although, on balance in the case, plaintiff is the prevailing
party, as plaintiff did not prevail substantially on this latest issue, the court has determined that

..;;;

the attorneys fees should be reduced by $4,700 as it relates to the motion on damages.
Accordingly, the total fees awarded by this Court are $59,607.25.
In arriving at this fee award the court is left with no doubt that the legal work was actually

vJ

performed. In fact, this court is been on the receiving end of the majority of the legal work. The
legal work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. This entire case has
,..;,

been prosecuted and brought to a resolution by way of motion practice. Thus, the work was
reasonably necessary. The attorneys' billing rates are consistent with those customarily charged
in this locality for similar services, and if anything, those rate are either at the average or below
it. The court has also considered the fact that the motion practice in this case has been
substantial and the legal issues presented somewhat complex. Therefore, the amounts incurred

~

for briefing the court on these issues are reasonable. Lastly, this court notes that the attorneys fee

7
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provision of the contract at issue is quite broad and includes expressly attorneys fees which may
have been incurred prior to the commencement litigation, for which an affidavit has been filed,
and to which no objection was lodged.
Conclusion
As indicated, plaintiff's counsel shall prepare and submit a judgment and order reflecting

the court's rulings, with leave to review the figure discussed in court for prejudgment interest,
~

and submit that docwnent to the court within 10 days.
Dated May 30, 2014.
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EXHIBIT 10

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NEW YORK A VE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
DAMAGES

DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,

Case No. 090402295

Defendants and
Counterclaimants.

Judge: David N. Mortensen

This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment for
Damages and Liquidated Damages on May 15, 2014. The court having reviewed the motion and
memoranda filed herein, having heard the oral arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the
premises and having entered its ruling which is adopted by reference, now makes and enters the
following:
ORDER

1. Plaintiff seeks damages under Paragraph 16 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract
which is at issue in this case and which provides in pertinent part:

If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may
elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit as
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liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this contract or
pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated
damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand.
2. The facts are undisputed before this court, and plaintiffs counsel acknowledged at oral
argument, that plaintiff has never formally elected which of the contractual remedies under
paragraph 16 it is seeking. Specifically, plaintiff acknowledges that it has never, including up to
the time of oral argument on the motion for summary judgment for damages, made any demand
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the real estate purchase contract.
3. By virtue oflitigating the matter up to the threshold of trial the Plaintiff has elected its remedy
contractually. The court finds from the circumstances that the Plaintiff, as buyer, had elected to
"pursue other remedies available at law," specifically actual damages.
4. Because this case involves a contractual provision for the election of remedies, and not the
~

procedural doctrine of election of remedies, and because Plaintiff admits it has not ever (including
up to the present time) made a demand required by the contract in this case, by pursuing this
lawsuit Plaintiff has elected contractually the remedy of seeking actual damages and not a sum
equal to the "Earnest Money Deposit", however that term is interpreted under Paragraph 16 of the
real estate purchase contract, as liquidated damages.
5. The court has concluded that the Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter and has indicated
that attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiff.
6. The court will not allow any of the costs claimed except for the filing fee of $360.00. The other
costs submitted are the normal expenses of litigation, should be subsumed in general attorneys
fees or are otherwise not costs that have typically been allowed by Utah courts, and are not

awarded to Plaintiff.
7. Some entries on the billing statements indicated simply "research" with no indication as to the
issues being researched. Under such circumstances, the court is unable to determine whether the
issues researched would require the hours of research indicated. Plaintiff has indicated that
disclosing such information would violate the work product privilege. The court notes that the
case is essentially over and there seems little reason, if any, to withhold the information. More
fundamentally, Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to essentially keep secret the topics of this research.
But at the same time, Plaintiff cannot seek reimbursement for them when their subject matter is
kept secret. The court has deducted from attorneys fees all such entries.
~

8. The court has considered the fact that a majority of fees incurred in the fall of 2013 are related
to the present motion for partial summary judgment. In the courts' view, a significant part of the

vo

ultimate theory of the Plaintiff did not prevail in the motion for summary judgment for damages.
Although, on balance in the case, plaintiff is the prevailing party, as plaintiff did not prevail
substantially on this latest issue, the court has determined that the attorneys fees should be reduced
by $4,700 as it relates to the motion on damages.
9. In arriving at the attorney fee award, the court is left with no doubt that the legal work was
actually performed. In fact, this court has been on the receiving end of the majority of the legal
work.
10. The legal work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. This entire case
has been prosecuted and brought to a resolution by way of motion practice. Thus, the work was
reasonably necessary.
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11. The attorneys' billing rates are consistent with those customarily charged in this locality for
similar services, and if anything, those rates are either at the average or below it. The court has
also considered the fact that the motion practice in this case has been substantial and the legal
issues presented somewhat complex. Therefore, the amounts incurred for briefing the court on
these issues are reasonable.
12. Lastly, the court notes that the attorneys fee provision of the contract at issue is quite broad
and includes expressly attorneys fees which may have been incurred prior to the commencement
of litigation, for which an affidavit has been filed, and to which no objection was lodged.
13. The total attorneys fees awarded to Plaintiff by this court are the sum of $59,607.25.
14. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendants as follows:
A. Damages of $147,503.00
~

B. Interest at 10% per annum on the earnest money deposited with Defendants from August 31,
2009, the date of breach to June 23, 2014 $71,003.50. Per diem interest is $40.41
C. Attorneys fees $59,607.25

~

D. Court Costs $360.00
Total $278,473.75
~

15. After entry, such judgment shall bear interest as provided in U.C.A Section 15-l-4(3)(a).
16. The attorneys fees and costs awarded as provided above shall be augmented by such
reasonable attorneys fees and costs as shall be incurred by Plaintiff in the enforcement or
collection of the said judgment, as the same shall be established by affidavit.
THIS ORDER AND JUDGMENT EFFECTIVE WHEN SIGNED BY THE COURT ABOVE.

EXHIBIT 11

DAVID D. JEFFS, #1654
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
90 North 100 East/P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Phones (801) 373-8848
Facsimile (801) 373-8878
E-mail: ddjeffs@jeffslawoffice.com

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NEW YORK AVE., LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual,
Defendants and Counterclaimants.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
ORDER AND JUDGMENT AS TO
ATTORNEYS FEES OR TO AUGMENT
ATTORNEYS FEES AWARD
AND
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
REPLY MEMORANDUM
Case No. 090402295
Judge: David N. Mortensen

This matter came before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Order

ai.id

Judgment

as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award and upon Defendants' Motion to
Strike Reply Memorandum.

The court having reviewed the motions and memoranda filed

herein, and being fully advised in the premises and having entered its ruling now makes and
enters the following:

~; 1.082

,..;;

ORDER
1. Defendants' Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in support of the
Motion to Amend or Augment Attorneys Fees is granted.
2. The Court determines that Rules 52 and 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are the appropriate mechanism for the determination of the additional or augmented attorney's
fees requested by Plaintiff. The court further determines that Plaintiffs request was clearly
timely in that Plaintiff raised the issue both before and immediately after the Court entered the
Order and Judgment on July 1, 2014 (hereafter referred to as the "Order and Judgment").
3. Although the damages awarded to Plaintiff were resolved by way of summary
judgment, the factual issue as to the amount of the attorney's fees was determined under Rule
73 and can be addressed at this point in the litigation.
4. The Court determines that attorney's fees were incurred by Plaintiff in late 2013 and
2014 which have not already been determined by the Court. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's
fees for the reasons previously articulated by the Court in the earlier rulings and the Order and
Judgment.
5. As before, the Court finds that the legal work was actually performed. The legal
work was, in part, reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. The attorneys
billing rates are consistent with those customarily charged in this locality for similar services.
6. Of the $13,900.75 of additional attorneys fees claimed, a substantial portion of the
fees claimed for June 16, 2014 are related to an application for fees brought through an

2
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objection to the Order and Judgment, which process the Court has determined to be misplaced.
The fees for such date should be reduced by $618.75, or half the time billed for such date.
7. Of the $13,900.75 additional attorneys fees, $10,521.00 were incurred on the same
issues for which the Court had previously reduced Plaintiffs attorney's fees, namely liquidated
damages, because Plaintiff did not prevail on a majority of the damages Plaintiff sought. The
Court therefore concludes that such $10,521.00 of additional attorneys fees requested should
..;,

be reduced by 50% or $5,260.00.
8. Reducing the $13,900.75 amount of attorney's fees sought by Plaintiff by $618.75
and $5,260.00 leaves the sum of $8,022.00, which this Court awards to Plaintiff as additional
or augmented attorneys fees.
9. Accordingly the $59,607.25 total amount of attorney's fees awarded to Plaintiff in
the Order and Judgment is amended or augmented to be the sum of $67,629.25, and the Order
and Judgment is so amended.
10. The $278,473.75 total amount of the judgment granted to Plaintiff as set forth in
the Order and Judgment is similarly augmented by the additional $8,022.00 to be a total of
$286,495.75, and the Order and Judgment is so amended.

THIS ORDER AND JUDGMENT EFFECTIVE WHEN
SIGNED BY THE COURT ABOVE.

3
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